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General	  Douglas	  MacArthur	  has	  long	  been	  considered	  one	  of	  the	  premiere	  military	  generals	  in	  United	  States	  history.	  Although	  recent	  scholarship	  has	  scrutinized	  his	  failures1,	  he	  has	  maintained	  a	  renowned	  reputation.	  His	  father,	  General	  Arthur	  MacArthur,	  famously	  told	  him,	  “There	  are	  times	  when	  a	  truly	  remarkable	  soldier	  must	  resort	  to	  unorthodox	  behavior,	  disobeying	  his	  superiors	  to	  gain	  the	  greater	  glory.”2	  Consequently,	  Douglas	  MacArthur	  established	  his	  reputation	  by	  disobeying	  direct	  orders.	  These	  incidents	  in	  many	  ways	  defined	  and	  although	  made	  him	  controversial	  also	  helped	  to	  make	  him	  famous.	  MacArthur’s	  defiance	  began	  during	  his	  stint	  as	  a	  cadet	  at	  West	  Point,	  one	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Military	  Academies.	  This	  paper	  focuses	  on	  MacArthur’s	  defiant	  behavior	  throughout	  his	  career,	  ultimately	  ending	  with	  his	  infamous	  confrontation	  with	  President	  Harry	  S.	  Truman.	  It	  argues	  that	  MacArthur	  only	  escaped	  reprimand	  through	  his	  overwhelming	  public	  support	  and	  military	  brilliance.	  Ultimately,	  MacArthur	  was	  destroyed	  when	  his	  defiance	  became	  a	  threat	  to	  U.S.	  democracy	  and	  world	  peace	  and	  perhaps	  the	  survival	  of	  humanity.	  	  MacArthur’s	  defiance	  of	  authority	  prompted	  President	  Franklin	  Roosevelt,	  after	  winning	  the	  presidential	  election	  in	  1932,	  to	  reference	  him	  in	  a	  conversation	  with	  economist	  Rexford	  G.	  Tugwell:	  “’You	  said	  Huey	  [Long]	  was	  the	  second	  most	  dangerous	  person,	  didn’t	  you?’	  he	  asked.	  ‘Did	  I	  hear	  it	  the	  way	  you	  said	  it.”	  Roosevelt	  replied,	  “’You	  heard	  right,’	  he	  said.	  ‘Huey	  is	  only	  second.	  The	  first	  is	  Douglas	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Schaller,	  Michael.	  Douglas	  MacArthur:	  The	  Far	  Eastern	  General.	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  New	  York,	  1989).	  2	  Manchester,	  William.	  American	  Caesar:	  Douglas	  MacArthur	  1880-­‐1964.	  (Back	  Ray	  Books,	  New	  York,	  19780:	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MacArthur.’”	  3	  	  To	  Roosevelt’s	  recollection,	  Douglas	  MacArthur	  was	  the	  most	  dangerous	  man	  in	  America,	  over	  Louisiana	  Senator	  Huey	  Long,	  *	  which	  displays	  the	  potential	  threat	  MacArthur	  could	  place	  on	  U.S.	  policy	  and	  security.	  Roosevelt	  reasoned	  that	  MacArthur’s	  extreme	  disregard	  for	  authority	  put	  him,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  United	  States,	  in	  perilous	  situations	  that	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  alter	  not	  only	  World	  War	  II,	  but	  also	  United	  States	  history.	  After	  analyzing	  General	  Douglas	  MacArthur’s	  career,	  it	  is	  troubling	  that	  a	  man	  who	  consistently	  disregarded	  orders	  from	  superior	  officers	  accomplished	  and	  sustained	  such	  success	  in	  a	  rigid	  and	  structural	  military	  setting.	  	  MacArthur’s	  actions	  throughout	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  elevated	  him	  to	  being	  considered	  one	  of	  the	  top	  United	  States	  military	  commanders	  of	  the	  century.	  Accordingly,	  much	  scholarship	  has	  been	  produced	  relating	  to	  his	  many	  exploits.	  Journalist	  William	  Manchester	  wrote	  a	  national	  bestselling	  biography	  praising	  MacArthur—American	  Caesar:	  Douglas	  MacArthur	  1880-­‐1964.	  Furthermore,	  Geoffrey	  Perret	  wrote	  a	  biography	  entitled	  Old	  Soldiers	  Never	  Die:	  The	  
Life	  of	  Douglas	  MacArthur,	  which	  not	  only	  faults	  MacArthur	  at	  appropriate	  times,	  but	  also	  praises	  him.4	  In	  The	  Most	  Dangerous	  Man	  In	  America,	  Mark	  Perry	  concentrated	  on	  MacArthur’s	  actions	  following	  Franklin	  Roosevelt’s	  election	  to	  Presidency	  in	  1932.	  Seymour	  Morris	  Jr.	  who	  decided	  to	  focus	  on	  MacArthur’s	  position	  as	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Perry,	  Mark.	  	  The	  Most	  Dangerous	  Man	  in	  America:	  The	  Making	  of	  Douglas	  
MacArthur.	  (Basic	  Books,	  New	  York,	  2014):	  Prologue	  xi.	  *	  Huey	  Long	  was	  a	  politician	  and	  served	  as	  Governor	  of	  Louisiana	  from	  1928	  to	  1932.	  He	  was	  a	  Democrat,	  very	  outspoken	  and	  willing	  to	  take	  forceful	  action.	  He	  is	  best	  known	  for	  his	  Share	  Our	  Wealth	  program	  and	  planned	  to	  run	  for	  president	  in	  1936	  before	  being	  assassinated	  in	  1935.	  	  See:	  4	  Perret,	  Geoffrey.	  Old	  Soldiers	  Never	  Die:	  The	  Life	  of	  Douglas	  MacArthur.	  (Adams	  Media	  Corporation,	  Holbrook,	  MA,	  1996).	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commander	  of	  the	  occupation	  of	  Japan	  following	  World	  War	  II,	  wrote	  Supreme	  
Commander:	  MacArthur’s	  Triumph	  In	  Japan.5	  Michael	  Schaller	  wrote	  a	  biography,	  
Douglas	  MacArthur:	  The	  Far	  Eastern	  General,	  which	  focused	  on	  MacArthur’s	  career	  in	  the	  Far	  East.6	  Historians	  such	  as	  Michael	  Schaller	  exploit	  his	  defiance	  as	  a	  critique	  and	  degrade	  his	  achievements,	  yet	  minimize	  certain	  examples	  of	  his	  military	  brilliance.	  Michael	  D.	  Pearlman’s	  book,	  Truman-­‐MacArthur:	  Policy,	  Politics,	  And	  The	  
Hunger	  For	  Honor	  And	  Renown,	  was	  entirely	  devoted	  to	  the	  Truman-­‐MacArthur	  debates	  during	  the	  Korean	  War.7	  These	  biographies	  are	  able	  to	  utilize	  many	  sources	  of	  information	  in	  order	  to	  typically	  provide	  both	  sides	  of	  MacArthur’s	  character.	  	  Historians	  offer	  several	  different	  theories	  as	  to	  why	  MacArthur	  continually	  disregarded	  direct	  orders	  from	  his	  superiors,	  but	  generally	  focus	  on	  one	  or	  two	  episodes	  rather	  than	  his	  entire	  career.	  I	  contend	  that	  MacArthur	  defied	  his	  superiors	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  his	  superiors	  lacked	  front-­‐line	  combat	  experience.	  Essentially,	  MacArthur	  trusted	  his	  own	  brilliance	  and	  continually	  utilized	  his	  experiences	  from	  combat	  to	  make	  his	  own	  tactical	  decision	  instead	  of	  following	  the	  orders	  of	  inexperienced	  general	  and	  presidents	  (e.g.	  George	  C.	  Marshal,	  Dwight	  Eisenhower,	  Herbert	  Hoover,	  Roosevelt,	  and	  Truman).	  While	  Truman	  did	  see	  combat	  in	  World	  War	  I,	  he	  was	  a	  reservist,	  which	  placed	  a	  natural	  animosity	  between	  himself	  and	  a	  West	  Point	  professional.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Morris,	  Seymour,	  Jr.	  Supreme	  Commander:	  MacArthur’s	  Triumph	  in	  Japan.	  (HarperCollins	  Publishers,	  New	  York,	  NY,	  2014).	  	  6	  Schaller,	  Douglas	  MacArthur,	  5.	  	  7	  Pearlman,	  Michael	  D.	  Truman-­‐MacArthur:	  Policy,	  Politics,	  And	  The	  Hunger	  For	  
Honor	  And	  Renown.	  (Indiana	  University	  Press,	  Bloomington	  and	  Indianapolis,	  IN,	  2008).	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Recently	  historians	  have	  examined	  MacArthur’s	  psychological	  state	  that	  could	  have	  contributed	  to	  his	  continual	  defiance	  of	  authority.	  While	  there	  is	  not	  enough	  evidence	  to	  definitively	  conclude	  that	  he	  had	  Narcissistic	  Personality	  Disorder	  (NPD),	  he	  does	  exhibit	  several	  traits	  and	  symptoms.	  The	  rudimentary	  symptoms	  of	  NPD	  include	  “a	  pattern	  of	  grandiosity,	  need	  for	  admiration,	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  empathy.”8	  However,	  it	  also	  can	  include	  fantasies	  with	  unlimited	  power	  and	  brilliance,	  a	  belief	  that	  the	  person	  is	  special	  and	  unique	  and	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  by	  other	  special	  people,	  is	  often	  envious,	  displays	  arrogant	  attitude,	  and	  is	  interpersonally	  exploitative.	  9	  MacArthur	  displays	  most	  of	  these	  traits	  and	  although	  the	  author	  is	  not	  qualified	  to	  make	  a	  diagnosis,	  it	  is	  quite	  possible	  that	  he	  had	  NPD.	  Furthermore,	  MacArthur’s	  continual	  reward	  for	  disobeying	  orders,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  medals	  or	  popular	  praise,	  served	  to	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  that	  defiance	  continuing	  and	  growing	  in	  intensity.	  	  
West	  Point	  (1899-­‐1903)	  	   In	  order	  to	  understand	  MacArthur’s	  supposed	  inherently	  defiant	  nature	  that	  made	  him	  ”the	  most	  dangerous	  man	  in	  America,”	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  understand	  that	  his	  insubordinate	  actions	  began	  as	  a	  cadet,	  from	  1899	  to	  1903.	  Schaller	  described	  early	  20th	  century	  West	  Point	  as	  “an	  anachronistic	  shrine	  most	  notable	  for	  outdated	  military	  instruction,	  brutal	  hazing,	  and	  an	  archaic	  curriculum.”10	  	  According	  to	  Manchester,	  there	  were	  hundreds	  of	  hazing	  techniques,	  but	  most	  notable	  were	  “scalding	  steam	  baths,	  ‘crawling’	  (being	  insulted	  by	  an	  upperclassman	  whose	  jaw	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Diagnostic	  And	  Statistical	  Manual	  Of	  Mental	  Disorders:	  DSM-­‐5	  Fifth	  Edition.	  (American	  Psychiatric	  Publishing,	  Washington,	  D.C.,	  2013):	  345.	  9	  DSM-­‐5,	  369-­‐370.	  	  10	  Schaller,	  Douglas	  MacArthur,	  5.	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was	  one	  inch	  from	  the	  plebe’s	  nose),	  ‘bracing’	  (standing	  at	  rigid	  attention	  for	  long	  periods	  of	  time),	  ‘dipping’	  (push-­‐ups),	  ‘eagling’	  (deep	  knee	  bends	  over	  broken	  glass)	  .	  .	  .”11	  MacArthur	  endured	  hazing	  to	  an	  extreme	  that,	  in	  one	  case,	  his	  legs	  convulsed	  after	  ”eagling.”	  In	  1900,	  when	  cadet	  Oscar	  L.	  Booz	  died	  of	  tuberculosis	  that	  was	  attributed	  to	  the	  hazing	  he	  suffered	  as	  a	  plebe,	  West	  Point	  garnered	  national	  attention.12	  This	  incident	  prompted	  President	  William	  McKinley	  and	  the	  War	  Department	  to	  order	  a	  special	  court	  inquiry	  by	  West	  Point	  and	  eventually	  a	  separate	  Congressional	  inquiry	  to	  investigate	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  hazing.	  The	  committee	  summoned	  MacArthur	  to	  testify	  as	  a	  key	  witness,	  as	  well	  as	  name	  the	  cadets	  who	  had	  hazed	  him.	  However,	  “if	  he	  did	  as	  ordered,	  he	  would	  incur	  the	  scorn	  of	  the	  entire	  corps.	  Yet	  if	  he	  refused	  to	  obey,	  he	  could	  be	  dismissed	  from	  West	  Point.”13	  Although	  MacArthur	  himself	  claimed	  in	  his	  Reminiscences	  that	  he	  did	  not	  provide	  any	  names,	  he	  did	  give	  the	  names	  of	  the	  cadets	  who	  had	  previously	  admitted	  guilt	  (or	  were	  already	  expelled)	  and	  declined	  to	  give	  the	  names	  demanded	  of	  him.14	  MacArthur’s	  refusal	  to	  incriminate	  cadets	  who	  had	  not	  confessed	  demonstrated	  his	  inherently	  defiant	  nature	  that	  characterized	  him	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  and	  enhanced	  his	  willingness	  to	  defy	  orders	  in	  the	  future	  while	  also	  cementing	  his	  reputation	  as	  one	  who	  would	  place	  his	  colleagues	  ahead	  of	  his	  military	  duty.	  	  	   Shortly	  following	  the	  Committee	  hearings	  on	  hazing,	  MacArthur	  captured	  attention	  again	  for	  defying	  the	  wishes	  of	  Lieutenant	  Colonel	  Wright	  P.	  Edgerton,	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Manchester,	  American	  Caesar,	  51.	  	  12	  “Military	  Board	  hears	  Testimony	  at	  Bristol	  and	  Philadelphia:	  Physician	  Says	  Alleged	  Treatment	  of	  the	  Cadet	  Might	  Have	  Made	  Him	  More	  Susceptible	  to	  Disease.	  
New	  York	  Time,	  December	  18,	  1900.	  13	  Perret,	  Old	  Soldiers,	  36.	  	  14	  Ibid.	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mathematics	  instructor	  at	  West	  Point.	  Due	  to	  an	  illness,	  MacArthur	  repeatedly	  missed	  weekly	  tests	  in	  mathematics	  during	  his	  second	  year	  at	  West	  Point.	  Typically,	  to	  avoid	  failing	  out	  of	  the	  course,	  students,	  referred	  to	  as	  “goats,”	  received	  a	  special	  examination.	  Upon	  seeing	  his	  name	  on	  the	  list	  of	  “goats,”	  MacArthur	  “went	  to	  see	  the	  instructor	  and	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  grades	  he	  had	  scored	  on	  those	  math	  tests	  he	  had	  taken	  were	  so	  high	  that	  in	  effect,	  he	  already	  had	  a	  passing	  grade.”	  Although	  MacArthur	  omitted	  this	  incident	  in	  his	  Reminiscences,	  mostly	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  he	  focused	  more	  on	  his	  actual	  military	  career,	  Geoffrey	  Perret	  claimed	  MacArthur	  threatened	  to	  resign	  from	  West	  Point	  when	  MacArthur	  stated,	  “I	  know	  it	  is	  an	  order,	  but	  it	  is	  an	  unreasonable	  one.	  If	  my	  name	  is	  not	  removed	  from	  that	  list	  by	  nine	  o’clock	  tomorrow	  morning,	  I	  will	  resign.”15	  	  Ultimately	  Lieutenant	  Colonel	  Edgerton	  removed	  Douglas’	  name	  from	  the	  list	  of	  “goats.”	  During	  his	  career	  at	  West	  Point,	  MacArthur	  “achieved	  the	  highest	  rank	  available	  to	  him—senior	  corporal	  as	  a	  yearling,	  senior	  first	  sergeant	  as	  a	  second	  classman,	  and,	  as	  a	  first	  classman,	  the	  crowning	  glory:	  first	  captain,	  like	  Lee	  and	  Pershing	  before	  him,”	  so	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  deduce	  that	  MacArthur	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  pass	  the	  “goat”	  test	  with	  ease.16	  Because	  MacArthur	  often	  flouted	  the	  rules	  as	  well	  as	  orders	  during	  his	  time	  at	  West	  Point,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  he	  defied	  superior	  officers	  during	  combat,	  which	  occurred	  during	  the	  Veracruz	  operation	  in	  1914.	  	  
Veracruz	  1914	  	   In	  September	  of	  1913,	  General	  MacArthur	  served	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  General	  Staff,	  which	  planned	  and	  prepared	  the	  U.S.	  Army	  for	  war;	  this	  position	  allowed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Perret,	  Old	  Soldiers,	  43.	  16	  Ibid.,	  54.	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MacArthur	  to	  serve	  closely	  with	  the	  Army	  Chief	  of	  Staff—Leonard	  Wood.	  Merely	  weeks	  after	  the	  election	  of	  President	  Woodrow	  Wilson	  in	  1912,	  General	  Victoriano	  Huerta	  seized	  control	  of	  the	  Mexican	  government	  and	  committed	  countless	  atrocities	  in	  the	  process.17	  Furthermore,	  U.S.	  ambassador	  Henry	  Lane	  Wilson	  aided	  Huerta	  in	  the	  murder	  of	  the	  President,	  at	  the	  time,	  Francisco	  Modero.	  In	  response,	  President	  Wilson	  refused	  to	  recognize	  the	  Huerta	  regime,	  and	  in	  October	  1913,	  sent	  a	  naval	  squadron	  under	  the	  command	  of	  Rear	  Admiral	  Frank	  Fletcher	  to	  the	  Tampico	  and	  Veracruz	  ports.	  Within	  months,	  several	  disputes	  occurred	  that,	  although	  seemed	  minor,	  threatened	  war.	  On	  April	  21,	  1914,	  American	  sailors	  and	  Marines	  seized	  and	  occupied	  the	  city	  of	  Veracruz.	  18	  Two	  weeks	  after	  the	  initial	  Veracruz	  incident,	  the	  General	  Staff	  ordered	  a	  small	  expeditionary	  force,	  commanded	  by	  Major	  General	  Frederick	  Funston,	  to	  Veracruz	  and,	  if	  necessary,	  a	  field	  army	  under	  the	  command	  of	  General	  Wood	  was	  to	  follow.19	  General	  Wood	  planned	  to	  mirror	  the	  strategy	  employed	  by	  General	  Winfield	  Scott	  in	  1848—lead	  his	  army	  from	  Veracruz	  to	  Mexico	  City	  in	  order	  to	  “conquer	  a	  peace.”20	  Wood	  sent	  then	  Captain	  Douglas	  MacArthur	  to	  Veracruz	  in	  order	  to	  “observe	  and	  report	  on	  all	  matters	  that	  might	  be	  useful	  to	  General	  Wood	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17Perret,	  Old	  Soldiers,	  68-­‐69.	  18	  The	  standard	  work	  on	  Veracruz	  is	  Quirk,	  Robert	  E.	  An	  Affair	  of	  Honor!	  Woodrow	  
Wilson	  and	  the	  Occupation	  of	  Veracruz.	  (Ley,	  KY,	  1982).	  Quirk	  does	  not	  mention	  the	  incident	  of	  MacArthur,	  leading	  one	  to	  conclude	  it	  is	  of	  relatively	  little	  importance.	  Ryan,	  Paul	  B.	  “Ten	  Days	  at	  Veracruz”	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Naval	  Institute	  98,	  No.	  6,	  1972:	  65.	  MacArthur,	  Douglas.	  Reminiscences:	  General	  of	  the	  Army	  Douglas	  
MacArthur.	  (McGraw-­‐Hill	  Book	  Company,	  New	  York,	  1964):	  40.	  19	  MacArthur,	  Reminiscences,	  40.	  20	  Perret,	  Old	  Soldiers,	  69.	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and	  the	  War	  Department.”21	  While	  there,	  Captain	  MacArthur	  quickly	  discovered	  the	  lack	  of	  transportation,	  which	  is	  vital	  to	  sustaining	  military	  success.	  Although	  severely	  lacking	  in	  animal	  and	  automobile	  transportation,	  Veracruz	  had	  an	  abundance	  of	  railcars;	  however,	  there	  were	  no	  locomotives	  to	  operate	  them.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  American	  railroad	  engines	  operate	  on	  a	  different	  size	  gauge,	  it	  was	  useless	  to	  ship	  U.S.	  locomotives	  to	  Veracruz.	  Determined	  to	  prevent	  a	  war,	  Funston	  was	  under	  orders	  by	  Wilson	  to	  restrict	  anyone	  from	  conducting	  reconnaissance	  behind	  Mexican	  lines.22	  	   However,	  MacArthur	  understood	  that	  the	  key	  to	  the	  success	  of	  any	  military	  conflict	  in	  Mexico	  depended	  on	  finding	  the	  locomotives,	  and	  he	  proposed	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  personal	  reconnaissance	  mission	  to	  Captain	  Constant	  Cordier,	  in	  order	  to	  discover	  the	  location	  of	  the	  locomotives.	  MacArthur’s	  idea	  eventually	  reached	  General	  Funston’s	  aide,	  Captain	  William	  G.	  Ball,	  as	  well	  as	  Captain	  W.A.	  Burnside.	  According	  to	  MacArthur’s	  Reminiscences,	  he	  did	  not	  approach	  General	  Funston;	  but	  “Major	  Alexander	  Dade	  of	  the	  cavalry,	  whom	  I	  had	  known	  since	  childhood,	  advised	  against	  the	  plan.”	  MacArthur	  believed	  his	  instructions	  from	  General	  Wood	  and	  the	  War	  Department	  permitted	  him	  to	  scout	  behind	  Mexican	  lines,	  regardless	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  General	  Funston	  and	  men	  under	  his	  command	  were	  prohibited	  from	  such	  actions.	  According	  to	  MacArthur’s	  memorandum,	  notes	  of	  what	  occurred	  read	  as	  follows:	  “I	  crossed	  our	  line	  unseen	  .	  .	  .	  .	  We	  reached	  Alvarado	  shortly	  after	  one	  o’clock	  and	  there	  found	  five	  engines	  .	  .	  .	  .	  I	  made	  a	  careful	  inspection	  of	  them	  and	  then	  started	  back.”23	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  MacArthur,	  Reminiscences,	  40.	  	  22	  Perret,	  Old	  Soldiers,	  70.	  23	  MacArthur,	  Reminiscences,	  40-­‐42.	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On	  his	  return	  trip,	  MacArthur	  and	  his	  few	  Mexican	  aides,	  were	  attacked	  and	  forced	  to	  kill	  several	  of	  Huerta’s	  soldiers.	  Although	  General	  Wood	  recommended	  MacArthur	  for	  the	  Medal	  of	  Honor,	  “an	  awards	  board	  rejected	  the	  recommendation	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  since	  Funston	  had	  not	  known	  about	  the	  reconnaissance,	  decorating	  Captain	  MacArthur	  ‘might	  encourage	  any	  other	  staff	  officer,	  under	  similar	  conditions,	  to	  ignore	  the	  local	  commander,	  possibly	  interfering	  with	  the	  latter’s	  plans	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  enemy.”24	  	  While	  it	  can	  be	  debated	  whether	  or	  not	  MacArthur’s	  actions	  were	  permissible	  according	  to	  Wood’s	  orders,	  junior	  officers	  have	  an	  obligation	  to	  inform	  local	  commanders	  of	  their	  potential	  actions—especially	  actions	  that	  occurred	  behind	  enemy	  lines.	  The	  fact	  that	  MacArthur	  was	  recommended	  for	  the	  Medal	  of	  Honor,	  an	  award	  he	  yearned	  for	  in	  order	  to	  live	  up	  to	  his	  father’s	  reputation,	  served	  to	  reinforce	  his	  defiant	  nature.	  MacArthur	  incensed	  at	  hearing	  the	  decision	  from	  the	  awards	  board,	  wrote	  a	  memorandum	  to	  the	  new	  Chief	  of	  Staff,	  Major	  General	  Hugh	  L.	  Scott,	  and	  claimed	  the	  board	  was	  too	  narrow	  minded	  and	  severely	  lacked	  imagination.25	  This	  memorandum	  is	  quintessential	  of	  MacArthur’s	  insubordinate	  behavior,	  which	  only	  occurred	  with	  more	  and	  more	  severity	  as	  his	  military	  career	  grew.	  	  	   During	  World	  War	  I	  MacArthur	  remained	  defiant,	  yet	  became	  one	  of	  the	  most	  decorated	  soldiers	  in	  the	  United	  States	  Military.	  He	  won	  Seven	  Silver	  Stars,	  two	  
Croix	  de	  guerre’s,	  two	  Distinguished	  Service	  Cross’s,	  and	  a	  Distinguished	  Service	  Medal	  along	  with	  several	  Wound	  Chevrons	  while	  fighting	  in	  World	  War	  I.	  Beginning	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Manchester,	  American	  Caesar,	  76.	  25	  Perret,	  Old	  Soldiers,	  72.	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the	  war	  as	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  of	  the	  42nd	  Rainbow	  Division	  with	  the	  rank	  of	  Colonel,	  MacArthur	  ended	  the	  war	  as	  a	  Brigadier	  General.	  	  Due	  to	  his	  many	  successes	  in	  World	  War	  I,	  his	  popularity	  started	  to	  increase	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Following	  World	  War	  I,	  MacArthur	  became	  superintendent	  of	  West	  Point	  from	  1919-­‐1922.	  In	  this	  role,	  MacArthur	  implemented	  several	  radical	  changes	  that	  were	  rapidly	  discarded.	  These	  changes	  included	  dancing	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  curriculum,	  abolishing	  summer	  camp,	  requiring	  instructors	  to	  spend	  a	  month	  each	  year	  teaching	  at	  a	  civilian	  college,	  and	  dropping	  the	  standards	  of	  appearance.26	  His	  radical	  intentions	  to	  reform	  the	  traditional	  West	  Point	  curriculum	  display	  his	  affinity	  to	  defy	  his	  superiors,	  most	  of	  whom	  were	  all	  educated	  on	  traditional	  West	  Point	  standards	  and	  objected	  to	  these	  new	  reforms	  Although	  he	  claimed	  these	  changes	  were	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  adapt	  West	  Point	  to	  the	  20th	  century,	  none	  of	  his	  reforms	  stayed	  in	  place	  after	  he	  left.	  Between	  1922-­‐1925	  MacArthur	  spent	  several	  years	  in	  the	  Philippines	  and	  was	  promoted	  to	  Major	  General	  on	  January	  17,	  1925.	  MacArthur	  then	  commanded	  IV	  Corps	  Area,	  based	  in	  Fort	  McPherson,	  Georgia	  and	  in	  1927	  he	  was	  appointed	  as	  President	  of	  the	  American	  Olympic	  Committee.	  In	  1929	  MacArthur	  commanded	  the	  Philippine	  Department,	  but	  was	  appointed	  to	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  on	  November	  21,	  1930,	  where	  he	  became	  famous	  for	  his	  disobedience	  during	  the	  Bonus	  Expeditionary	  March	  in	  1932.	  	  
The	  Bonus	  Expeditionary	  Force	  1932	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  global	  economic	  depression	  of	  the	  early	  1930s,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Perret,	  Old	  Soldiers,	  118-­‐119.	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Americans	  experienced	  drastic	  levels	  of	  hardship	  forcing	  them	  to	  request	  aid	  from	  the	  national	  government.	  	  The	  legend	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  Bonus	  Expeditionary	  Force	  (BEF)	  and	  the	  battle	  of	  the	  Anacostia	  Flats	  are	  well	  known	  and	  were	  a	  direct	  consequence	  of	  the	  Great	  Depression.27	  However,	  the	  BEF	  movement’s	  roots	  stem	  back	  to	  1924	  when,	  against	  the	  wishes	  of	  President	  Calvin	  Coolidge,	  Congress	  issued	  roughly	  3.5	  million	  Adjusted	  Compensation	  Certificates	  to	  veterans	  of	  World	  War	  I,	  which	  amounted	  to	  nearly	  one	  thousand	  dollars,	  payable	  in	  1945	  or	  on	  the	  death	  of	  the	  holder.28	  Due	  to	  the	  widespread	  Depression	  and	  harsh	  economic	  times,	  many	  veterans	  requested	  the	  money	  before	  1945.	  Consequently,	  in	  1932	  when	  Democrat	  Representative	  Wright	  Patman	  of	  Texas	  introduced	  a	  bill	  to	  pay	  veterans	  a	  cash	  bonus,	  thousands	  of	  veterans	  flocked	  to	  Washington	  D.C.	  to	  pressure	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  bill.29	  	  By	  mid-­‐June,	  the	  BEF	  had	  nearly	  15,000	  members	  encamped	  on	  U.S.	  government	  property—in	  Anacostia	  as	  well	  as	  along	  Pennsylvania	  Avenue	  in	  buildings	  scheduled	  to	  be	  razed.	  Although	  the	  bill	  passed	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  (211-­‐176),	  the	  Senate	  rejected	  the	  bill	  by	  a	  wide	  margin	  on	  June	  17,	  1932.	  The	  Bonus	  Marchers,	  awaiting	  the	  reconsideration	  of	  the	  bill,	  remained	  in	  the	  city	  and	  increased	  their	  pressure	  on	  the	  government	  by	  marching	  around	  the	  Capitol.	  On	  July	  16,	  Congress	  adjourned	  until	  December,	  which	  resulted	  in	  thousands	  of	  marchers	  returning	  home.	  However,	  nearly	  10,000	  Bonus	  marchers	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Roger,	  Daniels.	  The	  Bonus	  March:	  An	  Episode	  of	  the	  Great	  Depression.	  (Greenwood	  Publishing	  Company,	  Westport,	  Connecticut,	  1971).	  Paul,	  Dickson.	  The	  Bonus	  Army:	  
An	  American	  Epic.	  (Walker	  &	  Co.	  New	  York,	  2004).	  	  28	  Perret,	  Old	  Soldiers,	  155.	  	  29	  Price,	  John	  W.	  “The	  Army	  Evicts	  The	  Bonus	  Marchers,”	  Military	  Review	  51,	  no.	  5	  (1971):	  57.	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stayed	  in	  Washington	  in	  order	  to	  continue	  their	  pressure	  group	  tactics.	  To	  make	  room	  for	  a	  new	  building,	  the	  Treasury	  Department	  decided	  to	  demolish	  several	  of	  the	  “residences”	  of	  the	  BEF	  located	  on	  government	  property.	  After	  a	  brief	  battle	  with	  insurance	  companies,	  the	  government	  decided	  “to	  evict	  the	  Bonus	  Marchers—not	  merely	  from	  these	  buildings,	  but	  from	  all	  other	  Government	  property	  .	  .	  .”30	  Government	  officials	  sent	  out	  eviction	  notices	  in	  the	  morning	  of	  July	  28	  and	  proceeded	  to	  clear	  government	  property	  immediately	  thereafter.	  	  An	  altercation	  broke	  out	  between	  local	  authorities	  and	  a	  small	  group	  of	  marchers	  who	  reclaimed	  one	  of	  the	  buildings	  that	  had	  been	  previously	  evacuated.	  Pelham	  D.	  Glassford,	  the	  superintendent	  of	  police,	  took	  charge	  of	  the	  situation,	  but	  protestors	  struck	  him	  with	  a	  brick	  and	  attacked	  the	  authorities,	  resulting	  in	  the	  hospitalization	  of	  Glassford	  and	  five	  policemen.	  Merely	  two	  hours	  after	  that,	  a	  second	  outbreak	  of	  violence	  occurred	  which	  prompted	  a	  protest	  of	  5,000	  marchers.31	  It	  was	  at	  that	  point,	  according	  to	  MacArthur’s	  Reminiscences,	  that	  the	  Army	  “defused	  the	  situation.”32	  	  Secretary	  of	  War,	  Patrick	  J.	  Hurley,	  ordered	  Army	  Chief	  of	  Staff,	  General	  Douglas	  MacArthur,	  to	  “have	  United	  States	  troops	  proceed	  immediately	  to	  the	  scene	  of	  the	  disorder	  .	  .	  .	  .	  Surround	  the	  affected	  area	  and	  clear	  it	  without	  delay.”33	  Against	  the	  advice	  of	  his	  aides,	  predominantly	  Dwight	  Eisenhower,	  MacArthur	  took	  command	  of	  the	  situation	  personally	  and	  refused	  to	  delegate	  the	  task	  to	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Price,	  “The	  Army,”	  57-­‐59.	  	  31	  Perret,	  Old	  Soldiers,	  157.	  32	  MacArthur,	  Reminiscences,	  94.	  	  33	  Ibid.	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subordinate.34	  The	  ensuing	  action,	  according	  to	  MacArthur	  and	  verified	  by	  historians,	  was	  relatively	  peaceful,	  and	  by	  9:30	  P.M.	  authorities	  had	  cleared	  the	  area	  up	  to	  the	  Anacostia	  flats.	  The	  Army	  did	  employ	  tear	  gas,	  but	  the	  BEF	  retreated	  across	  Pennsylvania	  Avenue	  and	  retired	  to	  its	  camp.	  At	  this	  point,	  MacArthur	  received	  word	  from	  Hurley	  to	  suspend	  operations	  at	  his	  discretion.35	  	  There	  are	  multiple	  accounts	  of	  the	  battle	  of	  the	  Anacostia	  flats	  and	  the	  event	  has	  remained	  unclear	  to	  scholars	  today.	  In	  his	  own	  autobiography,	  MacArthur	  omitted	  the	  battle,	  which	  adds	  to	  the	  confusing	  situation.	  President	  Hoover	  realized	  an	  engagement	  against	  the	  main	  BEF	  encampment	  located	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  Anacostia	  River	  would	  reflect	  badly,	  so	  he	  “sent	  duplicate	  orders,	  via	  two	  officers,	  forbidding	  troops	  to	  cross	  the	  Eleventh	  Street	  Bridge.”	  However,	  MacArthur,	  directly	  insubordinate,	  “led	  his	  men	  across,	  and	  the	  tents,	  shacks,	  lean-­‐tos	  and	  packing	  crates	  which	  had	  sheltered	  the	  bonus	  marchers	  and	  their	  families	  were	  put	  to	  the	  torch.”	  In	  the	  battle,	  the	  Army	  inadvertently	  killed	  two	  infants	  and	  bayoneted	  a	  seven-­‐year-­‐old	  boy	  through	  the	  leg;	  this	  should	  have	  resulted	  in	  severe	  consequences	  for	  those	  involved,	  but	  did	  not.	  The	  incident	  altogether	  would	  have	  been	  avoided	  had	  MacArthur	  obeyed	  the	  orders	  of	  his	  superior	  President	  Hoover.	  36	  	  Scholars	  and	  historians	  who	  often	  praise	  MacArthur,	  including	  Manchester	  and	  Cornelius	  Ryan,	  are	  incapable	  of	  defending	  his	  actions	  during	  the	  clearing	  of	  the	  BEF.	  However,	  Geoffrey	  Perret	  came	  to	  an	  alternative	  theory	  that	  actually,	  if	  true,	  may	  exonerate	  MacArthur’s	  name.	  According	  to	  Perret,	  the	  orders	  Hoover	  sent	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Manchester,	  American	  Caesar,	  150.	  35	  MacArthur,	  Reminiscences,	  95.	  	  	  36	  Manchester,	  American	  Caesar,	  152.	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MacArthur	  never	  reached	  him.	  Hoover	  ordered	  Secretary	  of	  War	  Hurley	  to	  forbid	  troops	  from	  crossing	  the	  Eleventh	  Street	  Bridge,	  which	  cannot	  be	  disputed.	  Hurley,	  following	  the	  chain	  of	  command,	  sent	  Assistant	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  George	  Van	  Horn	  Moseley	  to	  deliver	  the	  message	  to	  MacArthur.37	  While	  historians	  often	  accept	  Moseley’s	  statement	  in	  his	  memoirs,	  that	  he	  delivered	  the	  orders	  to	  MacArthur,	  whom	  then	  deliberately	  violated	  orders	  in	  an	  act	  of	  clear	  insubordination—the	  truth	  may	  be	  more	  obscure.	  In	  Perret’s	  alternative	  theory,	  he	  claimed	  Moseley	  defied	  orders	  and	  refused	  to	  deliver	  the	  message	  to	  MacArthur.	  First-­‐hand	  accounts	  from	  Dwight	  Eisenhower,	  F.	  Trubee	  Davidson,	  and	  General	  Perry	  L.	  Miles	  corroborate	  Perret’s	  theory.38	  Although	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  believe	  scholars	  such	  as	  William	  Manchester	  and	  Cornelius	  Ryan	  would	  omit	  such	  evidence	  from	  their	  biographies,	  the	  testimonies	  of	  Eisenhower,	  Davidson,	  and	  Miles	  shed	  new	  light	  on	  the	  issue	  and	  may	  partially	  shield	  MacArthur	  from	  criticism.	  	  Regardless,	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  situation	  and	  the	  risk	  of	  repeated	  violence	  compelled	  President	  Hoover	  to	  order	  Patrick	  Hurley	  to	  send	  another	  message	  to	  MacArthur.	  Orders	  only	  reached	  MacArthur	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  had	  by	  this	  time	  agreed	  to	  give	  the	  BEF	  enough	  time	  to	  evacuate	  the	  women	  and	  children	  prior	  to	  the	  clearing	  of	  the	  camps.	  Patrick	  Hurley	  gave	  the	  message	  to	  a	  Colonel	  to	  deliver	  to	  MacArthur,	  but	  “	  Moseley	  told	  him	  to	  ‘get	  lost.’	  The	  Colonel	  took	  three	  hours	  to	  travel	  less	  than	  three	  miles.	  By	  the	  time	  he	  arrived	  at	  the	  Anacostia	  bridge,	  the	  soldiers	  .	  .	  .	  were	  moving	  out.”39	  	  Receiving	  the	  message,	  MacArthur	  sent	  word	  that	  it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Perret,	  Old	  Soldiers,	  158.	  	  38	  Ibid.,	  160.	  39	  Ibid.	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was	  too	  late	  to	  suspend	  operations.	  While	  Perret	  argues	  that	  the	  Colonel’s	  delay	  excuses	  MacArthur’s	  behavior,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  defend	  MacArthur	  when	  he	  received	  orders	  not	  to	  cross	  the	  bridge,	  yet	  did	  so	  regardless.	  Even	  though	  Perret	  justified	  MacArthur’s	  insubordinate	  actions,	  MacArthur	  was	  still	  clearly	  disobedient.	  He	  received	  orders	  to	  suspend	  operations,	  but	  in	  an	  act	  of	  defiance,	  crossed	  the	  bridge	  and	  cleared	  the	  main	  BEF	  camp	  on	  the	  Anacostia	  flats.	  	  Naturally,	  there	  was	  much	  criticism	  of	  how	  the	  government	  handled	  the	  situation;	  however,	  MacArthur	  subdued	  the	  situation	  by	  holding	  a	  late	  night	  press	  conference	  in	  which	  he	  received	  support	  from	  his	  staunch	  Republican	  allies.	  Holding	  this	  press	  conference	  before	  Hoover	  could	  act	  rescued	  him	  from	  disciplinary	  procedures.	  Understanding	  that	  Republicans	  approved	  of	  his	  show	  of	  strength,	  MacArthur	  disclaimed	  responsibility	  and	  praised	  Hoover’s	  actions.40	  MacArthur’s	  memoirs	  demonstrate	  this:	  If	  President	  Hoover	  had	  not	  acted	  when	  he	  did	  he	  would	  have	  been	  faced	  with	  a	  serious	  situation.	  Another	  week	  might	  have	  meant	  that	  the	  government	  was	  in	  peril.	  He	  had	  reached	  the	  end	  of	  an	  extraordinary	  patience	  and	  had	  gone	  to	  the	  very	  limit	  to	  avoid	  friction	  before	  using	  force.	  Had	  the	  President	  not	  acted	  when	  he	  did	  he	  would	  have	  been	  derelict	  in	  his	  duty.41	  	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  confirms	  MacArthur’s	  synopsis	  of	  the	  press	  conference.42	  Hoover	  would	  have	  lost	  even	  more	  public	  and	  political	  support	  had	  he	  disciplined	  MacArthur	  for	  insubordination.	  By	  stating	  Hoover	  rescued	  the	  government	  from	  a	  potentially	  perilous	  situation,	  MacArthur	  forced	  the	  President	  to	  accept	  his	  account.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Manchester,	  American	  Caesar,	  152.	  41	  MacArthur,	  Reminiscences,	  95.	  	  42	  “MacArthur	  Declares	  Hoover	  Had	  To	  Act:	  Another	  Week’s	  Delay	  Might	  Have	  Imperiled	  Government,	  General	  Declares,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  July	  29,	  1932.	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This	  is	  largely	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  Hoover	  had	  terribly	  low	  approval	  ratings	  and	  needed	  good	  press	  to	  have	  a	  chance	  at	  defeating	  Franklin	  Roosevelt	  in	  the	  November	  election.	  	  MacArthur’s	  nighttime	  press	  statement	  forced	  Hoover	  into	  supporting	  his	  insubordinate	  actions.	  Although	  openly	  disobedient	  and	  insubordinate,	  MacArthur	  maintained	  his	  position	  as	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  and	  escaped	  disciplinary	  actions	  due	  to	  not	  only	  his	  political	  maneuvering,	  but	  also	  through	  the	  use	  of	  national	  support	  via	  the	  press	  conference.	  	  By	  holding	  the	  press	  conference	  and	  connecting	  with	  the	  mass	  majority	  of	  citizens,	  MacArthur	  not	  only	  limited	  Hoover’s	  ability	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  situation,	  but	  also	  secured	  his	  own	  growing	  role	  in	  the	  U.S.	  military	  and	  American	  politics.	  	  
Defense	  of	  the	  Philippines:	  1941-­‐1942	  	   In	  1935,	  Douglas	  MacArthur	  resigned	  as	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  of	  the	  Army	  and	  retired	  to	  Manila,	  still	  a	  U.S.	  colony.	  He	  became	  a	  military	  advisor,	  with	  the	  rank	  of	  Field	  Marshal,	  to	  the	  newly	  formed	  Philippine	  national	  government.	  However,	  Franklin	  Roosevelt	  recalled	  MacArthur	  to	  active	  duty	  on	  July	  26,	  1941	  as	  war	  loomed	  and	  placed	  him	  in	  charge	  of	  American	  and	  Filipino	  forces	  in	  the	  Philippines	  making	  him	  the	  overall	  commander	  when	  the	  Japanese	  invaded—December	  8,	  1941.	  Although	  MacArthur’s	  defense	  of	  the	  Philippine	  islands	  can	  be	  considered	  lacking,	  the	  American	  defenders,	  who	  resisted	  Japanese	  attacks	  for	  five	  months,	  lasted	  much	  longer	  than	  the	  British	  and	  Dutch	  in	  Indonesia	  and	  Malaysia.	  Regardless	  of	  how	  the	  lengthened	  defense	  changed	  the	  Japanese	  battle	  plan,	  the	  defense	  transformed	  MacArthur	  into	  “the	  first	  American	  hero	  of	  the	  war.”43	  Yet,	  throughout	  the	  defense	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Schaller,	  Douglas	  MacArthur,	  56.	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of	  the	  Philippines,	  MacArthur	  consistently	  defied	  and	  disobeyed	  orders	  from	  his	  superiors.	  America’s	  need	  for	  a	  hero	  to	  support	  and	  to	  improve	  morale,	  both	  domestically	  and	  abroad,	  saved	  MacArthur	  from	  citations	  for	  insubordination	  and	  possibly	  even	  replacement.	  	  	   The	  Japanese	  enjoyed	  overwhelming	  success	  during	  the	  initial	  day	  of	  the	  invasion	  of	  the	  Philippine	  Islands	  resulting	  in	  the	  destruction	  of	  MacArthur’s	  air	  force	  at	  Clark	  Field,	  which	  has	  often	  led	  to	  much	  criticism	  among	  academic	  circles.44	  MacArthur	  discovered	  the	  U.S.	  declared	  war	  on	  Japan	  at	  5:30	  AM	  on	  December	  8.	  Consequently	  the	  War	  Department	  instructed	  him	  via	  radiogram	  to	  implement	  rainbow	  Five	  immediately,	  yet	  he	  hesitated.45	  Instead	  of	  acting	  on	  reliable	  information	  from	  Washington,	  MacArthur	  closed	  himself	  off	  in	  his	  office	  and	  communicated	  with	  his	  men	  via	  his	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  General	  Richard	  Sutherland.46	  Air	  Force	  Chief	  General	  Brereton	  requested	  permission	  to	  launch	  a	  B-­‐17	  strike	  against	  Formosa	  (Taiwan),	  which	  complied	  with	  the	  Rainbow	  Five	  plan,	  yet	  MacArthur	  did	  nothing;	  he	  did	  not	  give	  permission	  until	  nine	  hours	  after	  the	  Pearl	  Harbor	  attack.47	  To	  compound	  the	  issue,	  MacArthur’s	  strategy	  for	  the	  defense	  of	  the	  Philippines	  called	  for	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  Japanese	  invasion	  fleet	  barges	  before	  they	  reached	  the	  beaches,	  so	  it	  is	  curious	  as	  to	  why	  MacArthur’s	  air	  force	  remained	  on	  the	  ground.48	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Manchester,	  American	  Caesar,	  207-­‐208.	  45	  Ibid.,	  208.	  46	  Schaller,	  Douglas	  MacArthur,	  56.	  47	  Ibid.,	  160	  48	  Manchester,	  American	  Caesar,	  207.	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Due	  to	  MacArthur’s	  clear	  defiance	  of	  not	  only	  his	  own	  defense	  plan,	  but	  also	  the	  United	  States’	  Rainbow	  Five,	  the	  Japanese	  destroyed	  his	  air	  force	  on	  December	  8.	  It	  was	  not	  until	  11	  AM	  that	  MacArthur	  authorized	  bombing	  missions—roughly	  nine	  hours	  after	  initially	  hearing	  about	  the	  attack	  on	  Pearl	  Harbor.	  Unfortunately	  for	  the	  Allied	  forces	  in	  the	  Philippines,	  Brereton	  recalled	  all	  of	  his	  P-­‐40s	  to	  refuel,	  leaving	  Clark	  Field	  without	  adequate	  fighter	  protection.	  Following	  the	  Japanese	  attack,	  “Clark	  was	  unrecognizable.	  All	  the	  hangars	  had	  been	  demolished.	  The	  parked	  aircraft	  had	  been	  reduced	  to	  tortured,	  charred	  skeletons,	  and	  a	  black,	  roiling	  pillar	  of	  oily	  smoke,	  towering	  into	  the	  sky,	  was	  visible	  as	  far	  away	  as	  Manila.”49	  The	  destruction	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Air	  Force	  on	  the	  Philippine	  islands	  severely	  hampered	  MacArthur’s	  ability	  to	  withstand	  a	  Japanese	  invasion.	  While	  it	  is	  likely	  the	  Philippines	  would	  have	  fallen	  nevertheless,	  American	  defenses,	  potentially,	  could	  have	  held	  out	  much	  longer	  than	  five	  months.	  Regardless	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  MacArthur,	  in	  Reminiscences,	  denied	  that	  General	  Brereton	  requested	  these	  bombing	  missions,	  he	  still	  failed	  to	  implement	  Rainbow	  Five	  as	  well	  as	  his	  defense	  plan	  for	  the	  Philippines.	  Military	  historians	  consistently	  point	  out	  MacArthur’s	  drastic	  failure	  on	  December	  8,	  so	  it	  is	  curious	  as	  to	  why	  MacArthur	  was	  able	  to	  retain	  command	  of	  his	  Pacific	  forces	  if	  he	  was	  wholly	  unsuccessful.	  	  Furthermore,	  MacArthur	  continued	  to	  disobey	  orders	  openly	  throughout	  the	  entire	  Japanese	  siege	  of	  the	  Philippines.	  For	  example,	  MacArthur	  cabled	  the	  War	  Department	  to	  convince	  Russia	  to	  enter	  the	  Pacific	  War.	  While	  diplomatic	  leaders	  endorsed	  this	  plan,	  they	  failed	  to	  realize	  that	  MacArthur	  severely	  crossed	  the	  line	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Manchester,	  American	  Caesar,	  212.	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separating	  military	  and	  civilian	  authority.50	  This	  act	  is	  crucial	  because,	  from	  this	  episode	  until	  his	  dismissal,	  MacArthur	  continually	  affected	  U.S.	  diplomatic	  relations.	  However,	  Roosevelt	  ordered	  MacArthur	  to	  return	  to	  Australia	  to	  take	  charge	  of	  the	  situation	  in	  order	  to	  direct	  the	  Pacific	  War.	  Even	  though	  MacArthur	  threatened	  to	  resign	  his	  commission,	  the	  general	  inevitably	  left	  the	  Philippines	  on	  March	  11,	  1942.	  Upon	  reaching	  Australia,	  MacArthur	  released	  a	  press	  statement,	  against	  the	  advice	  from	  the	  Office	  of	  War	  Information,	  in	  which	  he	  vowed	  to	  return	  and	  liberate	  the	  Philippine	  Islands.	  	  Throughout	  MacArthur’s	  defense	  of	  the	  Philippines,	  MacArthur,	  ironically,	  became	  a	  symbol	  of	  national	  resistance	  and	  continued	  to	  gain	  mass	  support	  domestically.	  	  George	  Kenney,	  a	  U.S.	  Army	  Air	  Forces	  general,	  observed,	  “The	  battle	  of	  Luzon	  stands	  out	  like	  a	  beacon	  of	  hope	  in	  comparison	  with	  the	  incredible	  debacle	  at	  Singapore,	  the	  easy	  fall	  of	  the	  Dutch	  East	  Indies,	  and	  the	  confusion	  in	  Washington.”51	  Furthermore,	  a	  “MacArthur	  craze”	  swept	  over	  America	  during	  the	  defense	  of	  the	  Philippines,	  which	  caused	  anti-­‐Roosevelt	  Republicans	  to	  magnify	  the	  achievements	  of	  MacArthur.	  These	  Republicans	  frequently	  assailed	  Roosevelt	  for	  rescuing	  the	  British	  and	  Russians,	  while	  leaving	  MacArthur	  to	  fight	  alone,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Allies	  were	  dedicated	  to	  defeating	  Nazi	  Germany	  first	  and	  Japan	  later.52	  	  When	  MacArthur	  retreated	  to	  Australia	  in	  March	  of	  1942,	  there	  were	  few,	  if	  any,	  Allied	  victories.	  American	  troops	  were	  just	  beginning	  to	  arrive	  in	  Africa,	  and	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Pacific	  operations	  had	  not	  yet	  taken	  place,	  as	  the	  Japanese	  had	  an	  overwhelming	  control	  over	  the	  vast	  Pacific	  region.	  Morale	  for	  the	  Allies,	  especially	  America,	  was	  at	  an	  all-­‐time	  low.	  To	  combat	  this	  issue,	  Roosevelt	  awarded	  MacArthur	  the	  Medal	  of	  Honor—an	  award	  he	  yearned	  for	  to	  match	  his	  father’s	  reputation.	  However	  as	  Michael	  Schaller	  states,	  “Two	  years	  later	  when	  asked	  to	  sign	  a	  special	  citation	  for	  the	  medal,	  Roosevelt	  claimed	  he	  could	  not	  recall	  what	  heroism	  the	  award	  was	  actually	  based	  on.”53	  This	  is	  because	  Roosevelt	  awarded	  the	  medal	  to	  boost	  morale;	  he	  gave	  it	  to	  him	  to	  provide	  the	  United	  States	  with	  a	  hero	  figure	  to	  support.	  MacArthur	  proved	  he	  was	  one	  of	  the	  few	  Allied	  generals	  capable,	  not	  of	  defeating	  the	  Japanese,	  but	  of	  stalling	  them.	  Therefore,	  he	  provided	  a	  chance	  to	  improve	  morale.	  So	  while	  he	  was	  directly	  insubordinate	  to	  superiors,	  MacArthur	  was	  able	  not	  only	  to	  retain	  his	  command,	  but	  also	  won	  the	  Congressional	  Medal	  of	  Honor	  to	  improve	  the	  fragile	  Allied	  morale.	  It	  was	  at	  this	  point	  that	  MacArthur	  began	  to	  gain	  massive	  amounts	  of	  domestic	  support	  that	  only	  grew	  throughout	  his	  re-­‐conquest	  of	  the	  Philippines.	  	  
Re-­‐taking	  the	  Philippines:	  1944-­‐1945	  MacArthur’s	  insubordination	  and	  defiance	  littered	  his	  campaign	  to	  liberate	  the	  Filipino	  people	  from	  Japanese	  oppression.	  MacArthur	  admitted	  in	  his	  memoirs	  that	  “The	  Philippine	  Islands	  had	  constituted	  the	  main	  objective	  of	  my	  planning	  from	  the	  time	  of	  my	  departure	  from	  Corregidor	  in	  March	  1942	  .	  .	  .	  .	  I	  regarded	  this	  strategic	  archipelago	  as	  the	  keystone	  of	  Japan’s	  captured	  island	  empire	  .	  .	  .”54	  This	  was	  because,	  by	  seizing	  the	  Philippine	  Islands,	  the	  U.S.	  effectively	  cut	  the	  Japanese	  access	  to	  oil,	  which	  is	  the	  lifeblood	  of	  a	  modern	  military.	  Furthermore,	  the	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Philippines	  lay	  directly	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  main	  sea	  route	  to	  and	  from	  Japan	  from	  the	  resource	  rich	  Indies,	  Malaya,	  and	  Indo-­‐China.	  Thus,	  taking	  the	  Philippines	  also	  limited	  Japanese	  production	  capabilities.55	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  MacArthur’s	  plan	  for	  re-­‐taking	  the	  Philippines	  was	  entitled	  “Reno,”	  and	  he	  selected	  the	  island	  of	  Mindanao	  as	  the	  initial	  tactical	  objective.	  According	  to	  MacArthur,	  “The	  advance	  would	  be	  made	  by	  a	  combination	  of	  airborne	  and	  seaborne	  operations,	  always	  supported	  by	  the	  full	  power	  of	  land-­‐based	  aviation,	  and	  assisted	  by	  the	  fleet	  operating	  in	  the	  open	  reaches	  of	  the	  Pacific.”	  “Reno”	  called	  for	  troops	  to	  move	  across	  the	  enemy’s	  lightly	  guarded	  defense	  line,	  allowing	  them	  to	  bypass	  more	  heavily	  defended	  areas.	  Operation	  “Reno”,	  later	  changed	  to	  “Musketeer	  II,”	  set	  November	  15,	  1944,	  as	  the	  date	  for	  the	  operations	  in	  southern	  Mindanao	  and	  December	  20,	  1944,	  at	  Leyte	  Gulf.	  Essentially	  the	  strategic	  plan	  called	  for	  “The	  prompt	  seizure	  of	  the	  Central	  Luzon	  area	  to	  destroy	  the	  principal	  garrison,	  command	  organization	  and	  logistic	  support	  of	  hostile	  defense	  against	  Japan.”56	  	  However,	  air	  reconnaissance	  discovered	  serious	  weaknesses	  in	  Japanese	  air	  defense	  over	  Leyte	  in	  mid-­‐September,	  causing	  Admiral	  Halsey	  to	  suggest	  a	  change	  in	  strategy—to	  seize	  Leyte	  immediately.57	  MacArthur	  approved	  Halsey’s	  proposal,	  and	  soon	  they	  had	  permission	  from	  superiors	  to	  move	  up	  the	  invasion	  date	  for	  Leyte	  by	  two	  months	  to	  October	  20.	  The	  invasion	  of	  Leyte	  included	  four	  phases:	  	  Phase	  one	  covered	  minor	  preliminary	  landings	  to	  secure	  the	  small	  islands	  lying	  across	  the	  entrance	  to	  Leyte	  Gulf.	  Phase	  two	  included	  the	  main	  amphibious	  assaults	  on	  Leyte	  from	  Dulag	  to	  Tacloban,	  and	  called	  for	  the	  seizure	  of	  the	  airstrip,	  an	  advance	  through	  Leyte	  Valley,	  and	  the	  opening	  of	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San	  Juanico	  and	  Panaon	  Straits.	  The	  third	  phase	  consisted	  of	  the	  necessary	  overland	  and	  shore-­‐to-­‐shore	  operations	  to	  complete	  the	  capture	  of	  Leyte	  and	  the	  seizure	  of	  southern	  Sama.	  Phase	  four	  contemplated	  the	  occupation	  of	  the	  remainder	  of	  Samar	  and	  the	  further	  neutralization	  of	  enemy	  positions	  in	  the	  Visayas.58	  	  	  MacArthur’s	  defiant	  nature	  emerged	  even	  before	  the	  invasion	  occurred.	  On	  October	  19,	  MacArthur,	  aboard	  his	  flagship	  Nashvile,	  ordered	  all	  his	  officers	  to	  wear	  steel	  helmets	  and	  to	  take	  atabrine	  tablets	  to	  protect	  against	  malaria.	  However,	  in	  typical	  MacArthur	  fashion,	  he	  never	  took	  the	  atabrine	  tablets	  himself.59	  While	  it	  is	  not	  an	  act	  of	  insubordination	  per	  say,	  it	  does	  demonstrate	  willingness	  to	  take	  unnecessary	  risks.	  	  	   The	  liberation	  of	  the	  Philippines	  took	  far	  longer	  than	  initially	  expected.	  	  Although	  MacArthur	  declared	  imminent	  victory	  in	  Leyte	  on	  October	  29,	  1944,	  heavy	  fighting	  remained	  on	  the	  islands	  until	  the	  Japanese	  surrendered	  in	  March	  1945.60	  This	  is	  proven	  during	  the	  mopping-­‐up	  operations	  on	  Leyte,	  which	  occurred	  from	  November	  1944	  to	  the	  beginning	  of	  March	  1945,	  and	  resulted	  in	  the	  killing	  of	  27,000	  Japanese	  soldiers.	  Once	  Leyte	  was	  in	  relative	  American	  control,	  MacArthur	  aimed	  at	  seizing	  Mindoro:	  an	  island	  three	  hundred	  miles	  from	  the	  Leyte	  Gulf.	  However,	  the	  Pentagon	  had	  advised	  the	  General	  that	  the	  operation	  was	  “too	  daring	  in	  scope,	  too	  risky	  in	  execution.”61	  However,	  by	  this	  time	  MacArthur	  began	  to	  ignore	  cables	  from	  Washington.	  MacArthur’s	  complete	  disregard	  of	  cables	  from	  Washington	  shows	  his	  utter	  contempt	  for	  the	  War	  Department.	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After	  taking	  Leyte	  and	  Mindoro	  from	  the	  Japanese,	  MacArthur	  now	  needed	  to	  seize	  control	  of	  Luzon,	  which	  he	  invaded	  on	  January	  9,	  1945.	  Although	  he	  intended	  to	  re-­‐take	  Manila	  and	  Clark	  Field	  before	  his	  sixty-­‐fifth	  birthday	  on	  January	  26,	  General	  Yamashita’s	  war	  of	  attrition	  prevented	  this.	  American	  forces	  entered	  Manila	  on	  February	  5,	  which	  prompted	  a	  Japanese	  rampage	  against	  the	  citizens	  and	  civilians	  of	  Manila.	  When	  the	  fighting	  ceased	  in	  Manila,	  on	  March	  3,	  almost	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  capital	  lay	  in	  ruins.62	  It	  was	  not	  until	  July	  4,	  roughly	  five	  weeks	  before	  Japan’s	  ultimate	  surrender	  that	  MacArthur	  announced	  the	  official	  end	  of	  the	  Philippine	  campaign.63	  	  One	  of	  the	  more	  intriguing	  actions	  of	  MacArthur	  occurred	  after	  the	  Yalta	  Conference	  in	  1945,	  where	  the	  U.S.	  secured	  Russian	  participation	  in	  the	  Pacific	  War.	  During	  this	  conference,	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  told	  the	  British,	  without	  consulting	  MacArthur,	  that	  the	  U.S.	  had	  no	  plans	  to	  re-­‐take	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Philippines;	  however,	  without	  informing	  the	  JCS	  of	  his	  intentions,	  MacArthur	  planned	  and	  executed	  more	  than	  a	  dozen	  amphibious	  operations	  in	  the	  central	  and	  southern	  Philippines.64	  The	  JCS	  gave	  MacArthur	  wide	  latitude	  to	  a	  point.	  He	  had	  no	  specific	  directives	  for	  any	  operations	  subsequent	  to	  Luzon.	  This	  has	  led	  Manchester	  to	  conclude	  that	  MacArthur	  was	  directly	  challenging	  the	  JCS’s	  authority.	  As	  Manchester	  notes	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  Korean	  War,	  “It	  is	  little	  wonder	  that	  this	  same	  commander	  less	  than	  six	  years	  later	  would	  act	  with	  insolence	  towards	  his	  superiors	  in	  Washington.”65	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MacArthur’s	  disobedience	  plagued	  his	  defense	  of	  the	  Philippines,	  as	  well	  as	  his	  campaign	  to	  re-­‐take	  the	  islands.	  It	  continues	  to	  puzzle	  military	  historians	  as	  to	  how	  MacArthur	  was	  able	  to	  keep	  his	  command.	  During	  the	  Philippines,	  it	  was	  a	  combination	  of	  factors.	  While	  his	  defense	  of	  the	  archipelago	  is	  at	  times	  confusing,	  his	  forces	  did	  hold	  out	  much	  longer	  than	  any	  other	  allied	  unit.	  Therefore,	  his	  superiors	  could	  not	  fire	  one	  of	  the	  few	  generals	  who	  showed	  promise	  to	  defeat	  or	  at	  least	  limit	  Japanese	  advances.	  Furthermore,	  because	  MacArthur	  sustained	  such	  success	  in	  the	  Philippines	  his	  national	  support	  never	  decreased.	  During	  the	  re-­‐taking	  of	  the	  Philippines,	  MacArthur	  continued	  to	  garner	  national	  attention	  and	  his	  public	  support	  grew.	  Additionally,	  following	  the	  death	  of	  Franklin	  Roosevelt,	  President	  Truman	  left	  tactical	  decisions	  in	  the	  Philippines	  up	  to	  MacArthur	  because	  the	  islands	  received	  a	  low	  priority.	  MacArthur’s	  defiant	  and	  insubordinate	  behavior	  continued	  and	  grew	  while	  on	  post	  in	  Japan	  during	  the	  American	  Occupation.	  However,	  considering	  this	  paper	  is	  focused	  on	  his	  military	  career	  and	  his	  clear	  acts	  of	  defiance	  to	  superior	  officers,	  it	  seems	  best	  to	  include	  only	  his	  major	  acts	  of	  defiance.	  	  	  	  
Occupation	  of	  Japan:	  1945-­‐1950	  MacArthur	  entered	  Japan	  on	  August	  30,	  1945	  amidst	  the	  complete	  devastation	  of	  not	  only	  every	  city,	  but	  also	  the	  entirety	  of	  Japanese	  infrastructure.	  After	  accepting	  the	  Japanese	  surrender	  aboard	  the	  battleship	  Missouri,	  MacArthur	  became	  the	  supreme	  commander	  and	  “virtual	  ruler	  of	  seventy	  million	  people.”66	  The	  U.S.	  government	  as	  well	  as	  MacArthur	  immediately	  set	  out	  to	  rebuild	  Japan	  through	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reforms.	  After	  the	  demobilization,	  the	  United	  States	  and	  MacArthur	  planned	  to	  rebuild	  industry.	  Referring	  to	  the	  building	  of	  industry,	  Army	  Secretary	  Royall	  stated	  in	  January	  1948	  that	  further	  destruction	  of	  industry	  would	  leave	  Japan	  vulnerable	  to	  aggression.	  In	  response,	  MacArthur	  “established	  a	  Holding	  Company	  Liquidation	  Commission	  (HCLC),	  which	  promptly	  designated	  over	  three	  hundred	  firms,	  possessing	  more	  than	  half	  of	  the	  nation’s	  industrial	  and	  commercial	  strength,	  as	  ‘excessive	  concentrations	  of	  economic	  power’	  and	  targets	  for	  dissolution.”67	  MacArthur’s	  reforms	  here	  were	  in	  direct	  opposition	  to	  U.S.	  policy	  for	  the	  occupation	  of	  Japan.	  However,	  because	  Truman	  feared	  MacArthur’s	  impact	  on	  the	  1948	  election,	  he	  did	  nothing	  to	  reprimand	  him	  for	  going	  against	  the	  stated	  U.S.	  policy.	  Furthermore,	  from	  1948-­‐1950,	  MacArthur	  consistently	  criticized	  orders	  and	  delayed	  their	  implementation.68	  Although	  this	  is	  not	  a	  serious	  breach	  of	  the	  chain	  of	  command,	  it	  still	  was	  insubordination	  and	  potentially	  caused	  him	  to	  defy	  orders	  again	  not	  only	  during	  the	  occupation	  of	  Japan,	  but	  also	  in	  the	  Korean	  War.	  Furthermore,	  MacArthur’s	  popularity	  was	  steadily	  decreasing	  throughout	  the	  entire	  occupation	  of	  Japan	  and	  it	  was	  not	  until	  his	  success	  at	  Inchon	  in	  the	  Korean	  War	  that	  he	  regained	  his	  enormous	  support.	  	  MacArthur	  consistently	  disobeyed	  orders	  from	  President	  Truman	  and	  altered	  U.S.	  economic	  and	  political	  policy	  in	  the	  region,	  much	  like	  he	  unsuccessfully	  tried	  to	  do	  during	  the	  Korean	  War.	  Because	  Truman	  never	  reprimanded	  him	  for	  altering	  U.S.	  policy	  during	  his	  time	  as	  Supreme	  Commander,	  MacArthur’s	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insubordinate	  behavior	  only	  increased	  during	  the	  Korean	  War	  until	  it	  reached	  a	  crux	  and	  Truman	  finally	  relieved	  him	  of	  command.	  	  
The	  War	  in	  Korea:	  1950-­‐1952	  	  The	  Korean	  War	  was	  MacArthur’s	  last	  post	  as	  a	  military	  commander.	  It	  was	  not	  until	  the	  Korean	  War	  that	  his	  disobedience	  threatened	  U.S.	  policy,	  which	  resulted	  in	  his	  dismissal.	  MacArthur’s	  actions	  and	  aims	  in	  Korea	  can	  be	  defended	  to	  a	  point,	  it	  cannot	  be	  denied	  that	  he	  threatened	  the	  policy	  of	  the	  Truman	  administration,	  regardless	  of	  the	  debate	  about	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  this	  policy.	  The	  Truman	  administration	  succumbed	  to	  a	  policy	  of	  limited	  war	  in	  Asia	  during	  this	  time	  and	  greatly	  constricted	  MacArthur’s	  military	  effectiveness.69	  	  As	  in	  the	  Philippines,	  MacArthur’s	  insubordination	  during	  Korea	  was	  tolerated	  due	  to	  his	  military	  successes	  and	  brilliance	  in	  the	  face	  of	  adverse	  situations.	  On	  Sunday,	  June	  25,	  1950,	  a	  duty-­‐officer	  at	  MacArthur’s	  headquarters	  in	  Japan	  informed	  the	  general	  of	  the	  North	  Koreans	  crossing	  the	  38th	  parallel	  en	  masse	  and	  overwhelming	  South	  Korean	  defensive	  posts.70	  The	  Soviet-­‐trained	  North	  Korean	  army,	  equipped	  with	  modern	  weapons	  from	  the	  Soviets,	  easily	  routed	  South	  Korean	  forces	  because	  the	  State	  Department,	  trying	  to	  prevent	  South	  Korea	  from	  invading	  the	  north,	  equipped	  them	  with	  light	  weapons	  and	  no	  air	  or	  naval	  force.71	  	  Prior	  to	  approval	  from	  Washington,	  MacArthur	  dispatched	  a	  shipload	  of	  munitions	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under	  air	  cover	  to	  South	  Korea.72	  While	  MacArthur	  insisted	  that	  ordering	  this	  shipment	  of	  munitions	  to	  Korea	  was	  the	  correct	  military	  maneuver,	  he	  did	  not	  follow	  the	  command	  structure	  or	  wait	  for	  approval	  from	  JCS.	  Within	  days	  of	  the	  attack,	  the	  United	  Nations	  issued	  a	  statement	  essentially	  allowing	  the	  U.S.	  to	  “render	  every	  assistance”	  to	  the	  South	  Koreans	  militarily.	  Washington	  then	  ordered	  MacArthur	  to	  direct	  the	  U.S.	  Seventh	  Fleet	  to	  Formosa	  and	  prevent	  any	  Nationalist	  attack	  on	  the	  mainland	  and	  defend	  the	  island	  from	  Communist	  attack.73	  This	  directive	  by	  Washington	  alarmed	  China	  and	  resulted	  in	  two	  Chinese	  Armies	  to	  be	  moved	  to	  the	  border	  of	  Korea	  and	  China	  and	  be	  used	  in	  the	  Chinese	  intervention	  later	  in	  the	  Korean	  War.	  	  After	  visiting	  Seoul,	  MacArthur	  realized	  that	  he	  could	  only	  save	  South	  Korea	  with	  the	  immediate	  commitment	  of	  U.S.	  ground	  forces	  into	  the	  region.	  So	  he	  directed	  his	  soldiers	  into	  Korea	  to	  try	  to	  halt	  the	  North	  Korean	  advance.	  The	  JCS,	  on	  June	  30,	  1950,	  authorized	  the	  use	  of	  American	  ground	  forces	  to	  hold	  the	  port	  of	  Pusan	  and	  additionally	  permitted	  MacArthur	  to	  extend	  air	  operations	  north	  of	  the	  38th	  parallel.	  However,	  MacArthur	  had,	  hours	  before,	  ordered	  the	  attack	  of	  airfields	  north	  of	  the	  38th	  parallel;	  once	  again	  stretching	  the	  powers	  of	  his	  command.74	  MacArthur’s	  primary	  objective	  was	  to	  slow	  down	  the	  advance	  by	  putting	  his	  troops	  in	  piecemeal	  and	  bluffing	  the	  North	  Korean	  commander	  into	  thinking	  a	  much	  more	  substantial	  American	  force	  was	  in	  Korea	  than	  there	  actually	  was.	  The	  city	  of	  Pusan	  became	  the	  root	  of	  the	  U.S.	  defensive	  line	  in	  Korea.	  By	  the	  time	  the	  North	  Korean	  commander	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realized	  MacArthur’s	  deception,	  the	  Eighth	  Army	  under	  General	  Walton	  Walker	  was	  already	  in	  place	  in	  Pusan.	  MacArthur	  cabled	  Washington	  requesting	  massive	  reinforcements	  on	  July	  7,	  1950	  in	  order	  to	  strike	  behind	  the	  enemy’s	  lines	  in	  an	  amphibious	  operation.75	  Although	  MacArthur	  repeated	  this	  request	  twice,	  Washington	  refused	  and	  thus	  began	  the	  dialect	  of	  hostility	  between	  Washington	  and	  MacArthur	  during	  the	  Korean	  War.	  By	  July	  20,	  1950	  MacArthur	  began	  to	  prepare	  for	  an	  offensive	  with	  the	  invasion	  of	  the	  port-­‐city	  of	  Inchon.	  	  Before	  discussing	  MacArthur’s	  brilliance	  at	  the	  port	  of	  Inchon,	  his	  message	  to	  the	  Veterans	  of	  Foreign	  Wars	  needs	  to	  be	  addressed.	  On	  August	  17,	  1950,	  the	  President	  of	  the	  VFW	  invited	  MacArthur	  to	  send	  a	  message	  to	  be	  read	  at	  their	  annual	  encampment.	  	  The	  letter,	  according	  to	  MacArthur,	  “expressed	  my	  personal	  opinion	  of	  the	  strategic	  importance	  of	  Formosa	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  our	  defensive	  position	  in	  the	  Pacific.”	  Furthermore,	  MacArthur	  stated,	  “It	  was	  in	  complete	  support	  of	  the	  President’s	  announced	  policy	  toward	  Formosa.”	  However,	  a	  week	  after	  sending	  the	  message,	  MacArthur	  received	  a	  directive	  from	  President	  Truman	  telling	  him	  to	  withdraw	  the	  message	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  in	  conflict	  with	  the	  policy	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  which	  was	  dedicated	  to	  maintaining	  peace	  in	  Formosa	  by	  preventing	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐Shek’s	  Nationalist	  forces	  from	  attacking	  Communist	  China	  and	  vice-­‐versa.	  This	  prompted	  MacArthur	  to	  re-­‐examine	  the	  letter.76	  MacArthur	  claimed	  through	  the	  rest	  of	  his	  life	  that	  the	  letter	  was	  in	  complete	  support	  of	  the	  President.	  However,	  Truman	  correctly	  and	  conclusively	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  letter	  was	  in	  fact	  in	  direct	  contrast	  to	  U.S.	  policy.	  According	  to	  Truman,	  MacArthur	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advocated	  a	  policy	  of	  military	  aggression	  based	  on	  Formosa’s	  strategic	  location.77	  Furthermore,	  Truman	  argued	  the	  letter	  was	  “at	  odds	  with	  my	  announcement	  of	  June	  27,	  and	  it	  also	  contradicted	  what	  I	  had	  told	  Congress.”78	  U.S.	  policy	  regarding	  the	  Far	  East	  attempted	  to	  reduce	  the	  area	  of	  conflict,	  but	  MacArthur’s	  letter	  suggested	  otherwise	  and	  promoted	  further	  military	  build-­‐up.	  	  Michael	  Schaller	  argued	  that	  the	  letter	  told	  the	  world	  that	  America	  has	  “an	  uncontrollable	  military	  commander,”	  as	  well	  as	  a	  desire	  to	  have	  a	  base	  in	  Formosa.79	  William	  Manchester	  solved	  the	  debate	  by	  claiming	  that	  Truman	  essentially	  had	  two	  different	  policies—a	  domestic	  one	  and	  United	  Nations	  one.	  Furthermore,	  he	  argued	  that	  MacArthur,	  in	  this	  instance,	  “was	  a	  casualty	  of	  rough	  politics,	  a	  loser	  in	  a	  game	  whose	  rules	  he	  never	  mastered.”80	  Regardless,	  the	  letter	  almost	  pushed	  Truman	  into	  relieving	  MacArthur,	  but,	  due	  to	  his	  massive	  public	  support,	  doing	  so	  would	  set	  off	  a	  major	  political	  firestorm	  in	  the	  U.S.81	  MacArthur	  would	  have	  been	  relieved	  if	  it	  had	  not	  been	  for	  Truman’s	  fear	  of	  the	  political	  backlash	  of	  curbing	  MacArthur’s	  authority.	  These	  events	  left	  MacArthur	  increasingly	  resentful	  of	  his	  superiors	  in	  Washington,	  and	  Truman’s	  reluctance	  to	  reprimand	  MacArthur	  served	  to	  encourage	  his	  defiance.	  Additionally,	  his	  outright	  disagreement	  for	  stated	  U.S.	  policy	  only	  continued	  and	  increased	  until	  his	  dismissal.	  	  With	  the	  Pusan	  perimeter	  stable,	  MacArthur	  now	  decided	  for	  a	  decisive	  attack	  aimed	  at	  the	  rear	  of	  the	  North	  Korean	  lines.	  This	  tactical	  decision,	  if	  rendered	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successful,	  would	  effectively	  sever	  North	  Korean	  supply	  lines	  and	  encircle	  all	  enemy	  forces	  south	  of	  Seoul.	  MacArthur	  controversially	  chose	  the	  port	  of	  Inchon	  as	  the	  location	  for	  this	  amphibious	  landing.	  After	  MacArthur	  cabled	  Washington	  informing	  them	  of	  his	  operation	  planned	  for	  mid-­‐September,	  1950,	  he	  received	  much	  caution	  against	  the	  location.	  On	  August	  23,	  1950,	  MacArthur	  called	  a	  strategic	  conference	  in	  Tokyo	  to	  debate	  the	  issue,	  with	  Army	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  General	  Joseph	  L.	  Collins	  and	  Chief	  of	  Naval	  Operations	  Admiral	  Forrest	  P.	  Sherman	  in	  attendance.	  There	  were	  several	  problems	  with	  choosing	  Inchon	  as	  the	  site	  for	  the	  landing,	  all	  of	  which	  were	  pointed	  out	  by	  high-­‐ranking	  military	  officials	  at	  this	  meeting.	  A	  naval	  briefing	  staff	  argued	  that	  two	  elements—tide	  and	  terrain—made	  a	  landing	  at	  Inchon	  extremely	  hazardous.	  .	  .	  .	  Even	  under	  the	  most	  favorable	  conditions	  ‘Flying	  Fish	  Channel’	  was	  narrow	  and	  winding.	  Not	  only	  did	  it	  make	  a	  perfect	  location	  for	  enemy	  mines,	  but	  any	  ship	  sunk	  at	  a	  particularly	  vulnerable	  point	  could	  block	  the	  channel	  to	  all	  other	  ships.	  .	  .	  .	  Within	  two	  hours	  after	  high	  tide	  most	  of	  the	  assault	  craft	  would	  be	  wallowing	  in	  the	  ooze	  of	  Inchon’s	  mud	  banks,	  sitting	  ducks	  for	  Communist	  shore	  batteries.	  .	  .	  .	  In	  effect,	  the	  amphibious	  forces	  would	  have	  only	  about	  two	  hours	  in	  the	  morning	  for	  the	  complex	  job	  of	  reducing	  or	  effectively	  neutralizing	  Wolmi-­‐do.	  .	  .	  	  Furthermore,	  General	  Collins	  presented	  his	  arguments	  next;	  he	  argued	  the	  invasion	  of	  Inchon	  would	  take	  Marines	  from	  the	  Pusan	  perimeter,	  thus	  endangering	  the	  defensive	  line.	  Additionally,	  he	  proposed	  an	  alternate	  landing	  site	  at	  Kunsan,	  which	  was	  much	  further	  south	  of	  Inchon	  and	  had	  much	  less	  difficulty	  associated	  with	  it.82	  Omar	  Bradley	  and	  President	  Truman	  were	  primarily	  against	  the	  plan	  due	  to	  these	  excessive	  risks.	  Bradley	  concluded,	  “Inchon	  was	  probably	  the	  worst	  possible	  place	  ever	  selected	  for	  an	  amphibious	  landing.	  .	  .	  .	  I	  had	  to	  agree	  that	  it	  was	  the	  riskiest	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military	  proposal	  I	  had	  ever	  heard	  of.”83	  Furthermore,	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Dean	  Acheson	  reflected	  these	  risks	  in	  his	  memoirs.	  Although	  he	  never	  stated	  outright	  that	  he	  opposed	  Inchon,	  he	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  there	  were	  excessive	  and	  unnecessary	  hazards	  involved.84	  To	  MacArthur,	  all	  of	  these	  seeming	  impossibilities	  provided	  him	  with	  an	  opportunity	  to	  seize	  the	  element	  of	  surprise,	  and	  he	  argued	  effectively	  to	  maintain	  the	  Inchon	  operation.	  	   Despite	  its	  reluctance,	  the	  JCS	  approved	  MacArthur’s	  Inchon	  operation	  for	  September	  15,	  1950.	  Similar	  to	  re-­‐taking	  the	  Philippines	  in	  World	  War	  II,	  where	  MacArthur	  essentially	  destroyed	  Japanese	  supply	  routes,	  the	  “seizure	  of	  Inchon	  and	  Seoul	  will	  cut	  the	  enemy’s	  supply	  line	  and	  seal	  off	  the	  entire	  southern	  peninsula.	  .	  .	  .”85	  By	  landing	  at	  Inchon	  and	  quickly	  seizing	  Seoul,	  MacArthur	  could	  effectively	  destroy	  North	  Korean	  supply	  lines.	  Although	  MacArthur	  received	  a	  letter	  from	  the	  JCS	  on	  September	  8,	  1950	  that	  expressed	  doubt	  over	  the	  Inchon	  operation	  and	  suggested	  a	  delay,	  the	  invasion	  remained	  on	  schedule.	  This	  letter,	  doubting	  MacArthur’s	  operation,	  increased	  his	  resentment	  towards	  the	  Truman	  administration.86	  	  	   The	  invasion	  of	  Inchon	  demonstrated	  MacArthur’s	  absolute	  tactical	  brilliance.	  It	  enhanced	  his	  reputation	  domestically	  as	  well	  as	  globally.	  At	  8	  AM	  on	  the	  morning	  of	  September	  15,	  MacArthur	  received	  a	  note	  updating	  him	  on	  the	  situation:	  “the	  first	  wave	  of	  Marines	  have	  landed	  and	  secured	  a	  beachhead	  without	  a	  single	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fatality.”87	  Within	  two	  days,	  on	  September	  17,	  1950,	  Marines	  seized	  Kimpo	  Airfield	  near	  Seoul.	  During	  the	  initial	  landings	  at	  Inchon,	  MacArthur	  discovered	  that	  the	  North	  Koreans	  had	  started	  to	  construct	  massive	  fortifications	  to	  be	  completed	  within	  a	  month.	  Had	  he	  listened	  to	  his	  superiors	  and	  delayed	  the	  Inchon	  operation,	  MacArthur’s	  forces	  would	  have	  been	  slaughtered	  on	  the	  beaches.88	  This	  reinforced	  his	  egotistical	  nature	  and	  further	  enhanced	  his	  willingness	  to	  defy	  orders	  and	  advice	  from	  his	  superiors	  in	  Washington.	  MacArthur	  ordered	  to	  the	  prompt	  seizure	  of	  the	  South	  Korean	  capital	  city—Seoul.	  Within	  days,	  September	  28,	  1950,	  MacArthur’s	  forces	  cleared	  Seoul	  of	  enemy	  troops.	  MacArthur’s	  success	  at	  Inchon	  was	  remarkable;	  in	  “ninety-­‐six	  hours	  half	  of	  the	  In	  Min	  Gun,	  fifty	  thousand	  soldiers,	  was	  trapped	  between	  MacArthur’s	  two	  gigantic	  pincers	  .	  .	  .	  .	  MacArthur	  had	  freed	  all	  of	  South	  Korea	  of	  Communist	  domination	  in	  fifteen	  days.”89	  MacArthur	  immediately	  started	  the	  process	  to	  reinstate	  the	  South	  Korean	  government,	  which	  had	  been	  kicked	  off	  the	  peninsula	  when	  the	  North	  Koreans	  invaded.90	  	   As	  in	  the	  Philippines	  five	  years	  earlier,	  MacArthur	  intended	  to	  turn	  Seoul	  over	  to	  the	  South	  Korean	  government	  ceremoniously,	  so	  he	  informed	  the	  Pentagon	  of	  his	  intentions.	  The	  Truman	  administration	  replied	  to	  MacArthur’s	  intentions	  by	  advising	  him	  that	  any	  plans	  to	  restore	  President	  Rhee	  must	  have	  prior	  approval	  of	  higher	  authority.	  MacArthur	  instantly	  replied	  by	  saying,	  “Your	  message	  is	  not	  understood.	  .	  .	  .	  Such	  action	  is	  not	  only	  very	  much	  desired	  by	  the	  American	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Ambassador	  and	  all	  others	  concerned,	  but	  appears	  to	  be	  implicit	  in	  my	  directives.”91	  He	  consequently	  ignored	  the	  order	  to	  obtain	  prior	  approval	  and	  ordered	  that	  Seoul	  be	  formally	  restored	  to	  the	  South	  Korean	  government	  on	  September	  29,	  1950.	  This	  act	  of	  outright	  defiance	  demonstrated	  MacArthur’s	  growing	  resentment	  towards	  his	  superiors	  and	  specifically	  Truman.	  While	  MacArthur	  may	  have	  believed	  his	  actions	  were	  justified,	  the	  fact	  remains	  that	  he	  disobeyed	  direct	  orders	  and	  it	  was	  obvious	  that	  he	  was	  out	  of	  control—incapable	  of	  following	  orders.	  	  	   With	  South	  Korea	  in	  solid	  U.S.	  control,	  the	  decision	  to	  cross	  the	  38th	  parallel	  into	  North	  Korea	  loomed.	  Three	  factors	  influenced	  this	  decision:	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Communist	  China,	  members	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,	  and	  the	  risk	  of	  general	  war.	  The	  National	  Security	  Council	  recommended	  the	  crossing	  of	  the	  38th	  parallel	  so	  long	  as	  there	  “was	  no	  indication	  or	  threat	  of	  entry	  of	  Soviet	  or	  Chinese	  Communist	  elements	  in	  force.	  .	  .	  .	  However,	  no	  ground	  operations	  were	  to	  take	  place	  north	  of	  the	  38th	  parallel	  in	  the	  event	  of	  Soviet	  or	  Chinese	  Communist	  entry.92	  On	  September	  27,	  Washington	  provided	  MacArthur	  permission	  to	  cross	  into	  North	  Korean	  territory	  to	  conduct	  military	  operations.	  However,	  Washington	  gave	  him	  several	  restrictions:	  “he	  was	  forbidden	  to	  send	  aircraft	  over	  Sino-­‐Russian	  territory,	  and	  only	  ROK	  troops	  could	  approach	  the	  Yalu.”93	  Truman	  specifically	  said,	  “As	  a	  matter	  of	  policy,	  no	  non-­‐Korean	  ground	  forces	  were	  to	  be	  used	  in	  the	  provinces	  bordering	  on	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  or	  in	  the	  area	  along	  the	  Manchurian	  border.”94	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On	  October	  1,	  1950,	  MacArthur’s	  forces	  crossed	  the	  38th	  parallel	  into	  North	  Korean	  territory	  and	  pressed	  rapidly	  forward	  toward	  Pyongyang,	  while	  the	  X	  Corps	  landed	  at	  Wonsan.	  By	  mid-­‐October,	  MacArthur’s	  forces	  approached	  the	  line	  that	  only	  South	  Korean	  troops	  could	  cross.	  Chinese	  intervention	  in	  the	  Korean	  War	  has	  been	  significantly	  debated	  academically.	  While	  MacArthur	  is	  often	  blamed	  for	  not	  seeing	  the	  massive	  build-­‐up	  of	  Chinese	  troops,	  he	  did	  not	  accept	  the	  premise	  that	  a	  nuclear	  war	  was	  unwarranted	  or	  that	  Korea	  was	  a	  diversion	  to	  tie	  down	  U.S.	  forces,	  leaving	  Europe	  exposed.95	  The	  fall	  of	  Pyongyang,	  on	  October	  20,	  1950,	  symbolized	  the	  complete	  defeat	  of	  North	  Korea,	  “leaving	  only	  a	  type	  of	  guerrilla	  warfare	  in	  its	  place.”96	  
Wake	  Island	  Conference:	  October	  13-­‐17,	  1950	  With	  evidence	  of	  a	  slight	  Chinese	  troop	  movement	  toward	  the	  Yalu,	  Truman	  demanded	  a	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  meeting	  with	  MacArthur,	  at	  Wake	  Island.	  Truman	  arrived	  on	  Wake	  Island	  to	  meet	  MacArthur	  on	  the	  morning	  of	  October	  15.	  Truman	  and	  MacArthur	  discussed	  many	  aspects	  of	  Far	  East	  policy	  including	  Formosa,	  Chinese	  and	  Soviet	  intervention	  in	  Korea,	  Japan,	  North	  Korean	  Prisoners,	  and	  the	  overall	  war	  in	  Korea.97	  The	  entire	  purpose	  of	  this	  meeting	  was	  to	  ensure	  complete	  understanding	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  between	  MacArthur	  and	  the	  Truman	  administration.	  After	  the	  Wake	  Island	  meeting,	  while	  speaking	  in	  an	  Opera	  House	  in	  San	  Francisco	  on	  October	  17,	  1950,	  Truman	  outlined	  U.S.	  policy	  in	  Korea	  to	  the	  press:	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Our	  sole	  purpose	  in	  Korea	  is	  to	  establish	  peace	  and	  independence.	  Our	  troops	  will	  stay	  there	  only	  so	  long	  as	  they	  are	  needed	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  for	  that	  purpose.	  We	  seek	  no	  territory	  or	  special	  privilege	  in	  Korea	  or	  anywhere	  else.	  We	  have	  no	  aggressive	  designs	  in	  Korea	  or	  in	  any	  other	  place	  in	  the	  Far	  East	  or	  elsewhere.	  And	  I	  want	  that	  to	  be	  perfectly	  clear	  to	  the	  whole	  world.98	  	  Truman	  very	  bluntly	  told	  MacArthur	  during	  the	  Wake	  Island	  Conference	  not	  to	  provoke	  the	  Chinese	  and	  Soviet	  Union	  into	  a	  general	  war.99	  	  Merely	  mopping-­‐up	  operations	  remained	  in	  Korea,	  and	  on	  October	  24,	  1950,	  MacArthur	  violated	  orders	  once	  again	  and	  sent	  American	  units	  along	  the	  Chinese	  border	  because	  he	  believed	  that	  ROK	  troops	  were	  ineffective.100	  Truman	  pointed	  out	  this	  defiance	  of	  authority	  by	  saying,	  “The	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  had	  instructed	  MacArthur	  that	  in	  his	  advance	  north	  he	  should	  not	  place	  non-­‐Korean	  elements	  near	  the	  Manchurian	  and	  Soviet	  borders.	  But	  in	  his	  order	  to	  his	  commanders	  the	  general	  provided	  for	  the	  drive	  to	  the	  north	  to	  be	  spearheaded	  by	  American	  units.”101	  While	  this	  was	  obviously	  an	  act	  of	  total	  disobedience	  and	  insubordination,	  the	  JCS	  again	  dropped	  the	  issue.	  
Retreat:	  Winter	  1950-­‐1951	  	   By	  the	  end	  of	  October,	  1950	  Chinese	  Communist	  forces	  were	  already	  engaged	  in	  Korea	  and	  had	  fought	  against	  United	  Nations	  forces.102	  According	  to	  MacArthur,	  had	  Washington	  let	  him	  fight	  without	  restrictions,	  the	  Chinese	  may	  have	  been	  slaughtered,	  and	  their	  effect	  on	  the	  war	  severely	  limited.	  First,	  he	  claimed	  Washington	  limited	  the	  use	  of	  MacArthur’s	  Air	  Force	  by	  forbidding	  “hot	  pursuit	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  Truman,	  Memoirs,	  369	  	  99	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enemy	  planes	  that	  attacked	  our	  own.	  .	  .	  .	  denied	  the	  right	  to	  bomb	  the	  hydroelectric	  plants	  in	  North	  Korea.	  .	  .	  .	  refusal	  to	  let	  me	  bomb	  the	  important	  supply	  center	  at	  Racin.	  .	  .	  “	  While	  these	  directives	  may	  have	  been	  the	  right	  strategic	  decision	  to	  decrease	  the	  odds	  of	  Chinese	  and	  Soviet	  intervention,	  it	  displayed	  Washington’s	  intent	  to	  limit	  the	  war.	  Only	  to	  be	  countermanded	  by	  Secretary	  George	  Marshall,	  MacArthur	  “ordered	  General	  Stratemeyer	  to	  employ	  ninety	  B-­‐29’s	  on	  the	  following	  morning	  to	  destroy	  the	  Yalu	  bridges	  and	  cut	  this	  easy	  line	  of	  communication	  between	  Manchuria	  and	  North	  Korea,	  over	  which	  large	  armies	  of	  Chinese	  Reds	  could	  swarm.”103	  MacArthur	  later	  remarked:	  “The	  order	  not	  to	  bomb	  the	  Yalu	  bridges	  was	  the	  most	  indefensible	  and	  ill-­‐conceived	  decision	  ever	  forced	  on	  a	  field	  commander	  in	  our	  nation’s	  history.”104	  However,	  the	  Truman	  administration	  doubted,	  from	  an	  operational	  standpoint,	  “whether	  the	  results	  to	  be	  achieved	  would	  be	  important	  enough	  to	  outweigh	  the	  danger	  of	  bombing	  Antung	  or	  other	  points	  on	  the	  Manchurian	  side	  of	  the	  river.”105	  Truman	  later	  reminisced	  about	  the	  discovery	  of	  a	  highly	  secret	  report	  in	  which	  a	  Russian	  diplomat	  claimed	  the	  Soviet	  Air	  Force	  would	  retaliate	  in	  force	  if	  United	  Nations	  forces	  bombed	  Manchurian	  airfields.106	  MacArthur’s	  insistence	  on	  expanding	  operations	  by	  bombing	  targets	  near	  or	  in	  foreign	  territory	  demonstrates	  his	  outright	  disobedience	  to	  the	  Truman	  administration	  and	  desire	  to	  create	  a	  general	  all-­‐out	  war,	  which	  contradicted	  U.S.	  policy.	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   MacArthur’s	  troops	  occupied	  positions	  near	  the	  Yalu	  approaching	  the	  Manchurian	  border	  when,	  on	  November	  27,	  1950,	  massive	  numbers	  of	  Chinese	  troops	  commanded	  by	  Lin	  Piao	  invaded	  Korea.107	  These	  attacks	  forced	  the	  Eighth	  Army	  to	  make	  a	  rapid	  withdrawal	  and	  the	  X	  Corps	  under	  General	  Almond	  to	  retreat	  towards	  Wonsan.	  It	  soon	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  present	  forces	  in	  Korea	  did	  not	  have	  the	  strength	  to	  meet	  the	  new	  attack;	  MacArthur	  switched	  to	  the	  defense	  and	  ordered	  his	  troops	  to	  retreat.	  China’s	  intervention	  forced	  Washington	  to	  change	  its	  war	  policy	  from	  the	  entire	  unification	  of	  Korea	  to	  consider	  evacuating	  MacArthur’s	  entire	  army.	  By	  early	  January	  1951,	  the	  lines	  of	  U.S.	  forces	  had	  been	  stabilized	  and	  the	  Chinese	  supply	  lines	  were	  far	  overextended.	  Surprisingly,	  “MacArthur’s	  Korean	  retreat	  was	  one	  of	  his	  most	  successful	  feat	  of	  arms.	  .	  .	  .	  And	  the	  price	  the	  Chinese	  had	  paid	  for	  the	  ground	  yielded	  to	  them	  was	  shocking.”108	  While	  MacArthur’s	  successful	  retreat	  allowed	  him	  to	  maintain	  command,	  his	  insistence	  on	  speaking	  his	  mind	  to	  the	  press	  to	  demand	  a	  change	  in	  U.S.	  policy	  led	  to	  his	  relief.	  	  	  	  
MacArthur’s	  Dismissal:	  April	  11,	  1951	  	   Washington	  debated	  what	  to	  do	  in	  Korea	  during	  the	  winter	  of	  1950-­‐1951,	  and	  it	  finally	  decided	  to	  essentially	  settle	  for	  a	  tie—38th	  parallel.	  However,	  MacArthur	  consistently	  requested	  permission	  to	  widen	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  war	  in	  a	  series	  of	  letters	  and	  cables	  to	  the	  Truman	  administration	  and	  complained	  openly	  to	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the	  press	  throughout	  January	  1951.109	  This	  was	  in	  direct	  violation	  to	  a	  directive	  issued	  on	  December	  6,	  1950,	  which	  instructed	  civil	  and	  military	  officials	  to	  clear	  policy	  pronouncements	  with	  the	  State	  and	  Defense	  Departments	  and	  to	  avoid	  communicating	  opinions	  directly	  to	  the	  press.110	  	  Additionally,	  Truman	  believed,	  “we	  should	  not	  allow	  the	  action	  in	  Korea	  to	  extend	  into	  a	  general	  war.	  All-­‐out	  military	  action	  against	  China	  had	  to	  be	  avoided,	  if	  for	  no	  other	  reason	  than	  because	  it	  was	  a	  gigantic	  booby-­‐trap.”	  The	  Truman	  administration	  never	  allowed	  the	  Korean	  War	  to	  alter	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy.	  It	  knew	  the	  designs	  and	  goals	  of	  Soviet	  policy	  and	  knew	  that	  “in	  our	  age,	  Europe,	  with	  its	  millions	  of	  skilled	  workmen,	  with	  its	  factories	  and	  transportation	  network,	  is	  still	  the	  key	  to	  world	  peace.”111	  Had	  the	  U.S.	  widened	  the	  war	  in	  Korea	  to	  an	  all-­‐out	  war	  against	  China,	  Soviet	  forces,	  which	  enjoyed	  a	  10-­‐1	  military	  man-­‐power	  advantage,	  could	  have	  easily	  steam-­‐rolled	  through	  all	  of	  Europe	  and	  the	  U.S.	  would	  have	  been	  defenseless	  to	  stop	  them.	  Basically,	  as	  Truman	  later	  maintained,	  “If	  we	  became	  preoccupied	  in	  Asia,	  Russia	  would	  gain	  a	  free	  hand	  in	  Europe.”112	  Although	  MacArthur	  may	  have	  believed	  he	  was	  protecting	  U.S.	  interests	  by	  attempting	  to	  widen	  the	  war	  in	  Korea,	  he	  was	  wrong,	  as	  far	  as	  the	  Truman	  administration	  was	  concerned.	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MacArthur’s	  continual	  defiance	  of	  not	  accepting	  national	  policy	  and	  advocating	  aggression	  in	  Korea	  was	  the	  primary	  reason	  as	  for	  his	  dismissal.	  By	  mid-­‐March	  1951,	  MacArthur	  had	  retaken	  Seoul	  and	  reached	  the	  38th	  parallel.113	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  debate	  over	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  cross	  the	  38th	  parallel	  renewed	  itself.	  Washington	  decided	  on	  “the	  idea	  of	  holding	  a	  defensible	  line	  somewhere	  on	  the	  peninsula	  and	  then	  negotiating	  an	  armistice	  or	  orderly	  withdrawal.”114	  To	  MacArthur,	  this	  was	  the	  same	  as	  surrender.	  On	  March	  24,	  MacArthur	  issued	  his	  final	  statement	  as	  a	  commander,	  which	  led	  to	  his	  dismissal.	  MacArthur,	  referring	  to	  the	  38th	  parallel,	  stated,	  “Our	  naval	  and	  air	  forces	  cross	  it	  at	  will	  and	  both	  ground	  forces	  have	  done	  so	  in	  the	  past.”115	  	  In	  addition,	  he	  declared,	  	  Red	  China,	  of	  such	  exaggerated	  and	  vaunted	  military	  power,	  lacks	  the	  industrial	  capacity	  to	  provide	  adequately	  many	  critical	  items	  necessary	  to	  the	  conduct	  of	  modern	  war	  .	  .	  .	  .	  Formerly	  his	  great	  numerical	  potential	  might	  well	  have	  filled	  this	  gap	  but	  with	  the	  development	  of	  existing	  methods	  of	  mass	  destruction,	  numbers	  alone	  do	  not	  offset	  the	  vulnerability	  inherent	  in	  such	  deficiencies	  .	  .	  .	  .	  Red	  China,	  it	  has	  been	  shown	  its	  complete	  inability	  to	  accomplish	  by	  force	  of	  arms	  the	  conquest	  of	  Korea	  .	  .	  .	  .	  Within	  the	  area	  of	  my	  authority	  as	  the	  military	  commander,	  however,	  it	  would	  be	  needless	  to	  say	  that	  I	  stand	  ready	  at	  any	  time	  to	  confer	  in	  the	  field	  with	  the	  commander-­‐in-­‐chief	  of	  enemy	  forces	  in	  the	  earnest	  effort	  to	  find	  any	  military	  means	  .	  .	  .	  of	  the	  political	  objectives	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  in	  Korea	  .	  .	  .116	  	  Essentially,	  MacArthur,	  in	  his	  statement,	  threatened	  Communist	  China	  with	  an	  ultimatum	  and	  inferred	  that	  if	  they	  did	  not	  comply	  the	  full	  use	  of	  Allied	  power	  would	  be	  brought	  upon	  them.	  These	  statements	  not	  only	  violated	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  December	  6	  order,	  but	  also	  defied	  the	  official	  policy	  of	  the	  United	  States.	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   MacArthur’s	  insubordination	  reached	  a	  breaking	  point.	  Truman	  perceived	  these	  statements	  as	  an	  act	  of	  total	  insubordination,	  rightfully	  so.	  In	  his	  memoirs	  he	  wrote,	  “It	  was	  an	  act	  totally	  disregarding	  all	  directives	  to	  abstain	  from	  any	  declaration	  on	  foreign	  policy.	  It	  was	  in	  open	  defiance	  of	  my	  orders	  as	  president	  and	  as	  Commander	  in	  Chief.	  This	  was	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  President	  under	  the	  Constitution.	  It	  also	  flouted	  the	  policy	  of	  the	  United	  Nations.”	  It	  was	  by	  this	  act,	  Truman	  admitted,	  that	  he	  no	  longer	  could	  tolerate	  MacArthur’s	  insubordination.117	  	  	   Although	  Truman	  had	  thus	  already	  decided	  to	  relieve	  MacArthur	  of	  command	  before	  April,	  on	  April	  5	  another	  incident	  of	  disobedience	  occurred,	  which	  served	  to	  cement	  MacArthur’s	  fate.	  MacArthur	  wrote	  a	  letter	  on	  March	  20,	  1951,	  replying	  to	  Representative	  Joseph	  W.	  Martin,	  the	  minority	  leader	  in	  the	  U.S.	  House	  at	  the	  time.	  In	  this	  letter,	  MacArthur	  directly	  challenged	  the	  policy	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government	  and	  United	  Nations.	  He	  wrote,	  “Here	  in	  Asia	  is	  where	  the	  Communist	  conspirators	  have	  elected	  to	  make	  their	  play	  for	  global	  conquest	  .	  .	  .	  ;	  if	  we	  lose	  this	  war	  to	  Communism	  in	  Asia	  the	  fall	  of	  Europe	  is	  inevitable	  .	  .	  .	  .	  There	  is	  no	  substitute	  for	  victory.”118	  MacArthur’s	  letter	  to	  Martin	  contradicted	  U.S.	  policy	  to	  limit	  the	  war.	  To	  Truman,	  this	  letter	  showed	  that	  MacArthur	  was	  not	  only	  in	  disagreement	  with	  the	  policy	  of	  the	  U.S.,	  but	  also	  he	  challenged	  this	  policy	  through	  open	  insubordination	  to	  the	  President.	  At	  a	  news	  conference	  at	  1	  a.m.	  on	  April	  11,	  1951,	  Truman	  announced	  the	  relief	  of	  General	  MacArthur	  by	  stating,	  “I	  have	  concluded	  that	  General	  of	  the	  Army	  Douglas	  MacArthur	  is	  unable	  to	  give	  his	  whole-­‐hearted	  support	  to	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Government	  and	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  in	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matters	  pertaining	  to	  his	  official	  duties.”	  In	  MacArthur’s	  place,	  Truman	  appointed	  General	  Matthew	  Ridgeway.	  Furthermore,	  Truman	  explained	  the	  relief	  of	  MacArthur	  by	  saying	  to	  a	  radio	  audience,	  “The	  Free	  nations	  .	  .	  .	  have	  united	  their	  strength	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  prevent	  a	  third	  world	  war.”119MacArthur	  advocated	  an	  all-­‐out	  war;	  he	  planned	  to	  widen	  the	  war,	  which	  was	  in	  direct	  opposition	  to	  the	  official	  policies	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  Reacting	  to	  MacArthur’s	  view,	  Bradley	  stated,	  “this	  strategy	  would	  involve	  us	  in	  the	  wrong	  war,	  at	  the	  wrong	  place,	  at	  the	  wrong	  time,	  and	  with	  the	  wrong	  enemy.”120	  MacArthur’s	  incessant	  and	  continual	  defiance	  of	  policy	  threatened	  U.S.	  security	  and	  world	  peace.	  	  	  	   MacArthur	  simply	  could	  not	  understand	  why	  the	  Truman	  administration	  desired	  to	  fight	  a	  limited	  war.	  Molded	  to	  be	  a	  soldier	  from	  youth,	  MacArthur	  fought	  every	  war	  with	  the	  belief	  that	  it	  was	  a	  full-­‐scale	  war—to	  win	  and	  completely	  defeat	  the	  enemy.	  This	  is	  why	  he	  had	  such	  trouble	  accepting	  the	  Truman	  administration’s	  policy	  regarding	  Korea.	  	  His	  long	  career	  of	  insubordination	  and	  disobedience	  without	  facing	  disciplinary	  actions	  enhanced	  his	  willingness	  to	  defy	  his	  superiors.	  It	  is	  not	  surprising	  therefore	  that	  MacArthur	  defied	  and	  disobeyed	  several	  orders	  not	  only	  from	  his	  superiors	  in	  Washington,	  but	  also	  President	  Truman.	  Due	  to	  a	  MacArthur’s	  threat	  to	  peace,	  Truman	  relieved	  MacArthur	  of	  command.	  	  	   Although	  support	  for	  Truman	  has	  been	  steadily	  growing	  since	  the	  late	  1960s,	  his	  public	  support	  decreased	  as	  a	  result	  of	  MacArthur’s	  dismissal.	  While	  MacArthur	  was	  welcomed	  back	  to	  the	  U.S.	  as	  a	  hero;121	  Truman	  was	  harshly	  criticized	  and	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never	  had	  enough	  support	  to	  run	  in	  the	  next	  presidential	  election.	  The	  Truman-­‐MacArthur	  controversy	  killed	  Truman’s	  political	  career.	  Furthermore,	  MacArthur’s	  attempt	  to	  continually	  alter	  stated	  U.S.	  policy	  against	  the	  wishes	  of	  the	  President	  marked	  the	  first	  time	  in	  U.S.	  history	  that	  civilian	  oversight	  over	  military	  affairs,	  which	  is	  essential	  to	  maintaining	  a	  secure	  democracy	  and	  is	  explicitly	  stated	  in	  the	  U.S.	  constitution,	  was	  threatened.	  Due	  to	  MacArthur’s	  actions,	  nobody	  has	  threatened	  civilian	  oversight	  of	  the	  military	  since,	  which	  demonstrates	  how	  close	  he	  pushed	  the	  U.S.	  to	  an	  all-­‐out	  war.	  Ultimately,	  Truman	  was	  correct	  and	  the	  public	  eventually	  realized	  that	  he	  saved	  the	  U.S.	  from	  getting	  involved	  in	  another	  world	  war	  and	  possibly	  nuclear	  annihilation.	  	   General	  Douglas	  MacArthur	  continually	  defied	  orders	  from	  superior	  officers	  throughout	  his	  military	  career.	  This	  behavioral	  trend	  began	  as	  a	  cadet	  at	  West	  Point	  in	  1899	  and	  continued	  until	  his	  ultimate	  dismissal	  from	  command	  in	  1951.	  	  His	  insubordination	  not	  only	  defined	  him	  as	  well	  as	  his	  career,	  but	  also	  helped	  to	  make	  him	  famous.	  Because	  he	  consistently	  escaped	  reprimand	  due	  to	  his	  strategic	  brilliance	  and	  domestic	  support	  his	  defiant	  actions	  only	  increased	  in	  intensity	  and	  scope,	  as	  did	  his	  role	  in	  U.S.	  affairs.	  Ultimately,	  his	  ability	  to	  escape	  reprimand	  served	  to	  reinforce	  his	  willingness	  to	  repeat	  his	  defiant	  behavior.	  MacArthur	  was	  not	  dismissed	  from	  command	  until	  he	  threatened	  not	  only	  U.S.	  policy	  in	  the	  Korean	  War,	  but	  also	  threatened	  the	  security	  and	  democracy	  of	  the	  United	  States.	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Epilogue:	  1951-­‐1964	  	  	  	   MacArthur’s	  return	  to	  the	  U.S.	  was	  a	  triumphant	  affair.	  Millions	  of	  Americans	  applauded	  him.122	  Manchester	  describes	  his	  yearlong	  drive	  across	  the	  country	  by	  stating,	  He	  crisscrossed	  the	  United	  States	  in	  a	  one-­‐man	  drive	  to	  arouse	  the	  country	  to	  what	  he	  regarded	  as	  its	  peril.	  Invitations	  from	  mayors	  and	  governors	  had	  been	  accumulating	  in	  his	  suite	  since	  the	  night	  he	  had	  reached	  the	  hotel.	  At	  first	  he	  agreed	  to	  visit	  six	  cities,	  then	  eleven	  states;	  in	  the	  end	  the	  Great	  Homecoming,	  as	  the	  MacArthur’s	  called	  it,	  took	  them	  to	  Chicago,	  Milwaukee,	  Boston,	  Cleveland,	  Detroit,	  Houston,	  San	  Antonio,	  Evanston,	  Fort	  Worth,	  Miami,	  Los	  Angeles,	  Little	  Rock,	  Seattle,	  Norfolk,	  Austin,	  Natchez,	  Lansing,	  Dallas,	  Murfreesboro,	  Manchester,	  New	  Hampshire,	  and	  Portland,	  Oregon.	  Had	  he	  yielded	  to	  the	  appeals	  of	  all	  the	  communities	  that	  wanted	  him	  to	  come,	  he	  would	  have	  remained	  in	  perpetual	  motion.123	  	  Throughout	  his	  cross-­‐country	  tour	  MacArthur	  gave	  volatile	  political	  speeches	  denouncing	  Truman	  by	  claiming	  a	  communist	  influence	  played	  a	  role	  in	  the	  past	  direction	  of	  the	  public	  administration.	  However,	  with	  each	  swipe	  at	  Truman,	  MacArthur’s	  support	  decreased.124	  MacArthur	  briefly	  attempted	  win	  the	  1952	  Republican	  presidential	  nomination,	  but	  quickly	  lost	  to	  Eisenhower.	  Following	  the	  election	  of	  Eisenhower,	  MacArthur	  never	  again	  played	  any	  type	  role	  in	  U.S.	  affairs	  mainly	  because	  U.S.	  policy	  hereafter	  revolved	  around	  limited	  wars.	  Within	  one	  year,	  a	  year	  that	  began	  with	  an	  absolute	  overwhelming	  amount	  of	  public	  support,	  MacArthur	  was	  not	  even	  invited	  to	  San	  Francisco	  for	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Japanese	  peace	  treaty.125	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  Manchester,	  American	  Caesar,	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  Ibid.	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